Is Djibouti helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia
Djibouti's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€1m (−0.04% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €58m (1.6% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€83m; the other parts take €25m off it). The net is 1.6% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 4.1% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 89%).
likely from 4.1% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine · €59m · ≈ 0.35%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 1.6% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.04%
€1m
likely from 1.2% below zero to 0.23% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
1.6%
€58m
likely from 3.8% toward Russia to 1.1% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 88%
Russia kept €58m (1.6% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€83m; the other parts take €25m off it).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 1.6% of GDP more (€58m; likely from 3.8% toward Russia to 1.1% toward Ukraine)
Djibouti's own gain from trade with Russia: Djibouti kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €4m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Rough data: mostly estimates 74% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €83m of the net's €59m.
Small economy A small economy (GDP €3.6bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries were 72% smaller, the direction would flip.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.04% · €1m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−0.04%
€1m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 1.6% · €58m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−2.3%
€83m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.71%
€26m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.03%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€18m.
It bought €28m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025 (−99%). For Djibouti: €1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Djibouti's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Djibouti. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €12m extra from 2022 (0.32% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €83m (2.3% of one year's GDP).
How the number is backed
14 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 25% modelled (C) and 75% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found
Sources, by part
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
In money terms the net is −1.6% of one year's GDP (likely from 4.1% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 89%). Chance toward Russia: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €58m (1.6% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€83m; the other parts take €25m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
What decides Djibouti's number?
Chance toward Russia: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries were 72% smaller, the direction would flip.
We found no sanctions of Djibouti's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Djibouti.
War Balance