Is Bosnia and Herzegovina helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine
Bosnia and Herzegovina's support for Ukraine since 2022: €2m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €140m (0.55% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.56% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 3.9% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 85%).
likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 3.9% toward Ukraine · €142m · ≈ 0.12%/yr
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.56% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself.
Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
€2m
likely from 0.07% below zero to 0.03% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.55%
€140m
likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 3.9% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 85%
Russia kept €140m (0.55% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.55% of GDP less (€140m; likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 3.9% toward Ukraine)
Bosnia and Herzegovina's own gain from trade with Russia: Bosnia and Herzegovina kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Cut through sanctions it adopted Of the €230m less that Russia kept from its trade, about 73% was required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 27% went beyond them.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €31m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €229m of the net's €142m.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 62% smaller, the direction would flip.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €2m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.02%
€5m
Bosnia and Herzegovina kept part of others' aid, spent hereC
−0.01%
€3m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.55% · €140m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.90%
€229m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.33%
€84m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.02%
€5m
Bosnia and Herzegovina kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€1m
Bosnia and Herzegovina kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€49m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €0.31bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.14bn in 2025 (−53%). It sold €54m to Russia in 2021 and €54m in 2025 (+0%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 50.3% of what it bought from Russia. For Bosnia and Herzegovina: €5m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Bosnia and Herzegovina's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Pipeline gas
€0.35bn
€0.33bnrange €0.27bn to €0.45bn
not tracked
A
Coal
€75m
€71mrange €53m to €94m
not tracked
A
Other goods
€0.48bn
€0.56bn
–
All goods
€0.91bn
€0.97bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 73% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 27% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. Bosnia and Herzegovina is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Official EU reports say its alignment is incomplete. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Bosnia and Herzegovina. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €13m extra from 2022 (0.05% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €31m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€0.12bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Bosnia and Herzegovina; what its firms kept of it, €4m, is taken off its support.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €84m (0.33% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
23 sources back its parts: 6 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 74% modelled (C) and 26% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 62% smaller, the direction would flip.
Does Bosnia and Herzegovina trade with Russia?
It bought €0.14bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.31bn in 2021), and sold €54m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €140m (0.55% of GDP) less than without the war.
Is Bosnia and Herzegovina helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.56% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 3.9% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 85%). Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €140m (0.55% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Did Bosnia and Herzegovina cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 73% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 27% beyond what sanctions required.
How much has Bosnia and Herzegovina given to Ukraine?
Almost nothing that can be measured: €2m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).
How does Bosnia and Herzegovina compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Croatia +1.5%, Bosnia and Herzegovina +0.56%, Montenegro +0.37%, Serbia −1.4%.
Does Bosnia and Herzegovina have sanctions on Russia?
War Balance