Is the Gambia helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia
The Gambia's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €33m (1.5% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 1.5% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 3.0% toward Russia to 0.67% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 88%).
likely from 3.0% toward Russia to 0.67% toward Ukraine · €33m · ≈ 0.33%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 1.5% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more fuel bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
<€1m
likely from 0.02% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
1.5%
€33m
likely from 3.0% toward Russia to 0.67% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 88%
Russia kept €33m (1.5% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 1.5% of GDP more (€33m; likely from 3.0% toward Russia to 0.67% toward Ukraine)
The Gambia's own gain from trade with Russia: The Gambia kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €11m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €25m of the net's €33m.
Small economy A small economy (GDP €2.2bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 1.5% · €33m
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−1.2%
€25m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.28%
€6m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.08%
€2m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€14m.
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €4m from Russia in 2021 and €41m in 2025. For the Gambia: €2m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
The Gambia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
no customs record
€0.12bnrange €75m to €0.18bn
€0.26bn
C (estimate)
Other goods
–
€0m
–
All goods
–
€0.12bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of the Gambia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Gambia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €11m. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €6m (0.28% of one year's GDP).
How the number is backed
11 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 81% modelled (C) and 19% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found
In money terms the net is −1.5% of one year's GDP (likely from 3.0% toward Russia to 0.67% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 88%). Chance toward Russia: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €33m (1.5% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
We found no sanctions of the Gambia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Gambia.
War Balance