Does Georgia support Russia? Leaning toward Russia
Georgia's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€7m (−0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.2bn (4.1% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 4.1% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 6.7% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 87%).
likely from 6.7% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine · €1.2bn · ≈ 0.89%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 4.1% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 87%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.03%
€7m
likely from 0.48% below zero to 0.09% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
4.1%
€1.2bn
likely from 6.6% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 86%
Russia kept €1.2bn (4.1% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 3.7% of GDP more (€1.0bn; likely from 6.0% toward Russia to 2.7% toward Ukraine)
Georgia's own gain from trade with Russia: Georgia kept 0.39% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€109m; likely <0.01% to 1.3% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €113m (0.41% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €88m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 88% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €809m in 2021, €1.5bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 148% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €481m in 2021, €1.2bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €852m of the net's €1.2bn.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 87%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.03% · €7m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−0.05%
€14m
Hosting refugeesD
+0.04%
€10m
Georgia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD
−0.02%
€4m
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+<0.01%
€1m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 4.1% · €1.2bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−3.1%
€852m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.41%
€113m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.27%
€76m
Georgia kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−0.13%
€35m
Georgia kept more from selling to RussiaC
−0.10%
€29m
Georgia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.10%
€27m
Georgia kept more from settling Russia's tradeD
−0.06%
€16m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−<0.01%
€1m
Georgia's companies made more profit in RussiaD
−<0.01%
€1m
Georgia kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.41bn.
It bought €0.81bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.5bn in 2025 (+88%). It sold €0.48bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.2bn in 2025 (+148%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 26.2% of what it bought from Russia. For Georgia: €113m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. Depends on wages earned in Russia: remittances from Russia changed by −0.30% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: −€84m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely −€570m to +€393m); migrants sent €1.6bn home from Russia in that time. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Georgia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€0.33bn
€0.26bnrange €0.21bn to €0.28bn
€0.28bn
A
Oil products
€2.5bn
€2.3bnrange €2bn to €2.5bn
€1.2bn
A
Pipeline gas
€89m
€83mrange €71m to €92m
not tracked
A
Coal
€72m
€67mrange €59m to €74m
not tracked
A
Other goods
€5bn
€4.5bn
–
All goods
€8.1bn
€7.2bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
No. Georgia has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (25 February 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Georgia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €13m extra from 2022 (0.05% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €88m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Refugees from Ukraine
25,996 refugees from Ukraine, 6.8 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €10m (0.04% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Georgia: €10m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €76m (0.27% of one year's GDP). Georgia kept more from settling Russia's trade: €16m (0.06% of one year's GDP). Georgia kept more from shipping Russian oil: €1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
35 sources back its parts: 12 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 89% modelled (C) and 11% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −4.1% of one year's GDP (likely from 6.7% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 87%). Chance toward Russia: 87%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.2bn (4.1% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Georgia trade with Russia?
It bought €1.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.81bn in 2021), and sold €1.2bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.2bn (4.1% of GDP) more than without the war.
Georgia–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €1.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.81bn in 2021), and sold €1.2bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €7m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −4.1% of one year's GDP (likely from 6.7% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 87%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does Georgia help Russia get around sanctions?
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin.
How does Georgia compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Armenia −0.17%, Azerbaijan −2.5%, Türkiye −3.1%, Georgia −4.1%.
How many Ukrainian refugees does Georgia host, and what does it cost?
25,996 refugees from Ukraine, 6.8 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €10m (0.04% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Georgia: €10m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Does Georgia have sanctions on Russia?
No. Georgia has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (25 February 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Georgia. Sources: Georgian Prime Minister, 25 February 2022 (news report) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).
War Balance