War Balance
Namibia's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €100m (0.83% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€146m; the other parts take €45m off it). The net is 0.83% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 1.7% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 77%).
Leaning toward Russia by
0.83% of a year's GDP since 2022
likely toward Russia · 77%
likely from 1.7% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine · €100m · ≈ 0.18%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.83% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: 77%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.83%
€100m
likely from 1.8% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 77%
Russia kept €100m (0.83% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€146m; the other parts take €45m off it).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Russia: 77%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries were 69% smaller, the direction would flip.
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.83% · €100m
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −1.2% | €146m |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.41% | €50m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.03% | €4m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€35m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +<€1m | +€2m | +€2m | +0.02% |
| 2023 | +<€1m | −€35m | −€35m | −0.27% |
| 2024 | +<€1m | +€1m | +€1m | −0.27% |
| 2025 | +<€1m | −€31m | −€31m | −0.52% |
| 2026* | +<€1m | −€37m | −€37m | −0.83% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
It bought €31m from Russia in 2021 and €31m in 2025 (−1%). It sold €1m to Russia in 2021 and €8m in 2025. For Namibia: €4m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of Namibia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Namibia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.15bn (1.2% of one year's GDP).
Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Angola | +0.25%+€0.26bnlikely toward Ukraine · 92% |
| Zambia | −0.05%−€13messentially zero |
| Botswana | −0.07%−€12messentially zero |
| South Africa | −0.49%−€1.8bnvery likely · >99% |
| Namibia | −0.83%−€0.10bnlikely toward Russia · 77% |
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Mozambique | −0.85%−€0.16bnlikely toward Russia · 68% |
| United Arab Emirates | −0.71%−€3.5bnlikely toward Russia · 97% |
| Egypt | −0.43%−€1.7bnlikely toward Russia · 95% |
| Kenya | −0.31%−€0.33bnlikely toward Russia · 90% |
11 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 27% modelled (C) and 73% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −0.83% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.7% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 77%). Chance toward Russia: 77%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €100m (0.83% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€146m; the other parts take €45m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Chance toward Russia: 77%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries were 69% smaller, the direction would flip.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Angola +0.25%, Zambia −0.05%, Botswana −0.07%, South Africa −0.49%, Namibia −0.83%.
11 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Namibia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Namibia.
Leaning toward Russia
11 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/namibia/