War Balance
Re-exports to Russia and sanctions evasion: what passes through the UAE, Türkiye and Central Asia
From 2022 to August 2026, Russia kept €47.1bn more from trade with these 11 hubs together than without the war. Goods they passed on to Russia count for the countries that made them; each hub keeps its trading margin here.
What are re-export hubs, and what is sanctions evasion?
A re-export is a good that a country imports and sells on without changing it much: a phone made in China or a machine made in the EU that reaches Russia through the UAE, Armenia or Kazakhstan. Since sanctions and the exit of many Western firms cut direct sales to Russia, such hubs have handled part of its imports; when the goods are banned for Russia, this route is called sanctions evasion. This site counts re-exported goods for the country that made them, not for the hub; each hub keeps its own trade and its trading margin. So the table shows what each hub's own trade means for Russia, not every good that passed through it.
These numbers measure money: aid to Ukraine and the change in what Russia keeps from trade, against a world without the war. Weapons count at their money value: aid at market value when delivered, weapons and troops sent to Russia at the seller's gain where Russia paid and in full where it did not. Votes, diplomacy and intent are not in them.
Totals: the 11 members' best estimates added up, and as a share of their combined GDP. Each member's range and chance are on its row.
Members · 11
Sorted by “Russia kept from trade, vs no war” as a share of one year's GDP, from where Russia kept more to where it kept less, 2022 to August 2026. More or less: how much more or less Russia kept (taxes and profit, not sales) than in a world without the war; + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia; + adds to its support for Ukraine, − takes from it.
| # | Country | Russia kept from trade, vs no war | Net | Support for Ukraine |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Kyrgyzstan | 10.0% more€1.4bn more · €196 per person morelikely 0.76% to 18.7% toward Russiavery likely · 97% | −€1.4bn−10.0% of GDPvery likely · 97% | −€1m<0.01% of GDPessentially zero |
| 2 | Mongolia | 6.4% more€1.2bn more · €344 per person morelikely from 10.7% toward Russia to 7.8% toward Ukrainelikely toward Russia · 77% | −€1.2bn−6.4% of GDPlikely toward Russia · 77% | −€2m−0.01% of GDPessentially zero |
| 3 | Georgia | 4.1% more€1.2bn more · €302 per person morelikely from 6.6% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukrainelikely toward Russia · 86% | −€1.2bn−4.1% of GDPlikely toward Russia · 87% | −€7m−0.03% of GDPessentially zero |
| 4 | Uzbekistan | 4.1% more€4.1bn more · €113 per person morelikely 1.7% to 6.8% toward Russiavery likely · >99% | −€4.1bn−4.1% of GDPvery likely · >99% | −€3m<0.01% of GDPessentially zero |
| 5 | Türkiye | 3.1% more€32.8bn more · €384 per person morelikely 0.20% to 5.2% toward Russiavery likely · 96% | −€32.7bn−3.1% of GDPvery likely · 96% | +€0.16bn+0.02% of GDPessentially zero |
| 6 | Azerbaijan | 2.5% more€1.8bn more · €173 per person morelikely 0.86% to 4.1% toward Russiavery likely · 99% | −€1.7bn−2.5% of GDPvery likely · 99% | +€31m+0.04% of GDPessentially zero |
| 7 | Serbia | 1.4% more€1.1bn more · €160 per person morelikely from 3.6% toward Russia to 1.3% toward Ukrainelikely toward Russia · 83% | −€1.1bn−1.4% of GDPlikely toward Russia · 84% | −€2m<0.01% of GDPessentially zero |
| 8 | United Arab Emirates | 0.72% more€3.6bn more · €323 per person morelikely from 2.0% toward Russia to 0.22% toward Ukrainelikely toward Russia · 97% | −€3.5bn−0.71% of GDPlikely toward Russia · 97% | +€48m<0.01% of GDPessentially zero |
| 9 | Tajikistan | 0.39% more€46m more · €4 per person morelikely from 4.3% toward Russia to 4.5% toward Ukrainetoo close to call · 58% toward Russia | −€46m−0.40% of GDPtoo close to call · 58% toward Russia | −€1m<0.01% of GDPessentially zero |
| 10 | Armenia | 0.15% more€34m more · €11 per person morelikely from 8.9% toward Russia to 5.0% toward Ukrainelikely toward Russia · 69% | −€37m−0.17% of GDPlikely toward Russia · 69% | −€3m−0.02% of GDPessentially zero |
| 11 | Kazakhstan | 0.01% less€35m less · €2 per person lesslikely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraineessentially zero | +€55m+0.02% of GDPessentially zero | +€20m<0.01% of GDPessentially zero |
Each row: the best estimate, then its range and the chance of its direction, as in the country's panel.
Questions
Is Kazakhstan helping Russia evade sanctions?
Goods made elsewhere and sold on to Russia through Kazakhstan count here for the countries that made them, so Kazakhstan's own figure covers its own trade and its trading margin. Very likely toward Russia among these hubs: Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Türkiye and Azerbaijan.
Why are re-exports not counted for the hub?
The money for re-exported goods goes mostly to the maker; the hub keeps a margin. Counting the maker shows whose goods reach Russia.
Related
Ranking · Support for Ukraine by country · Trade with Russia by country · All topics · How it works
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/group/russia-trade-hubs/