Is Armenia helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia
Armenia's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€3m (−0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Armenia moved €34m (0.15% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Armenia kept more from selling to Russia, mostly profits sent to Russian owners (€152m; the other parts take €119m off it)). The net is 0.17% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 8.9% toward Russia to 5.0% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 69%).
likely from 8.9% toward Russia to 5.0% toward Ukraine · €37m · ≈ 0.04%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.17% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Chance toward Russia: 69%; 90% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.02%
€3m
likely from 0.21% below zero to 0.05% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.15%
€34m
likely from 8.9% toward Russia to 5.0% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 69%
Armenia moved €34m (0.15% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Armenia kept more from selling to Russia, mostly profits sent to Russian owners (€152m; the other parts take €119m off it)).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.62% of GDP less (€133m; likely from 7.6% toward Russia to 5.9% toward Ukraine)
Armenia's own gain from trade with Russia: Armenia kept 0.77% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€167m; likely from 4.1% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €86m (0.40% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €364m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Sold Russia 113% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €606m in 2021, €1.3bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €177m It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €177m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €19m. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
Russian-owned firms here Russian owners kept €152m (0.70% of GDP) more from their firms here.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 69%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 12% larger, the direction would flip.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.02% · €3m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−0.02%
€4m
Hosting refugeesD
+<0.01%
€1m
Armenia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD
−<0.01%
€1m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.15% · €34m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+1.5%
€318m
Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD
−0.70%
€152m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.40%
€86m
Armenia kept more from settling Russia's tradeD
−0.32%
€68m
Armenia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.30%
€64m
Armenia kept more from selling to RussiaC
−0.23%
€51m
Armenia's companies made less profit in RussiaD
+0.09%
€19m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD
+0.09%
€19m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.09%
€19m
Its firms paid Russia less taxD
+0.08%
€17m
Armenia kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−0.02%
€3m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.16bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €1.4bn from Russia in 2021 and €2bn in 2025 (+41%). It sold €0.61bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.3bn in 2025 (+113%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 37.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Armenia: €86m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. Depends on wages earned in Russia: remittances from Russia changed by +1.6% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: +€355m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely −€946m to +€1.8bn); migrants sent €3.9bn home from Russia in that time. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Armenia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
€1.2bn
€1.1bnrange €0.94bn to €1.4bn
not tracked
B
Pipeline gas
€1.7bn
€1.6bnrange €1.4bn to €1.9bn
not tracked
B
Other goods
€17.7bn
€6.6bn
–
All goods
€20.6bn
€9.3bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: B, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Armenia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Armenia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.36bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Refugees from Ukraine
4,830 refugees from Ukraine, 1.6 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Armenia: €2m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €0.15bn (0.70% of one year's GDP).
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Armenia kept more from settling Russia's trade: €68m (0.32% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €177m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €158m to €353m); €4m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
35 sources back its parts: 12 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 58% modelled (C) and 42% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −0.17% of one year's GDP (likely from 8.9% toward Russia to 5.0% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 69%). Chance toward Russia: 69%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Armenia moved €34m (0.15% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Armenia kept more from selling to Russia, mostly profits sent to Russian owners (€152m; the other parts take €119m off it)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Armenia help Russia get around sanctions?
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €177m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €158m to €353m); €4m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Does Armenia trade with Russia?
It bought €2bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.4bn in 2021), and sold €1.3bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Armenia moved €34m (0.15% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Armenia kept more from selling to Russia, mostly profits sent to Russian owners (€152m; the other parts take €119m off it)).
What decides Armenia's number?
Chance toward Russia: 69%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 12% larger, the direction would flip.
Does Armenia still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 37.4% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €2bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €1.4bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
How does Armenia compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Armenia −0.17%, Azerbaijan −2.5%, Türkiye −3.1%, Georgia −4.1%.
Does Armenia have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of Armenia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Armenia.
War Balance