Is Azerbaijan helping Russia? What the money flows show
Azerbaijan's support for Ukraine since 2022: €31m (0.04% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.8bn (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 2.5% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.82% to 4.1% toward Russia; very likely · 99%).
likely 0.82% to 4.1% toward Russia · €1.7bn · ≈ 0.53%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 2.5% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.04%
€31m
likely from 0.13% below zero to 0.10% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
2.5%
€1.8bn
likely 0.86% to 4.1% toward Russia very likely · 99%
Russia kept €1.8bn (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 2.4% of GDP more (€1.7bn; likely 0.83% to 3.8% toward Russia)
Azerbaijan's own gain from trade with Russia: Azerbaijan kept 0.08% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€54m; likely from 0.87% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €270m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 89% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.7bn in 2021, €3.2bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
Russian-owned firms here Russian owners kept €425m (0.61% of GDP) more from their firms here.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €1.3bn of the net's €1.7bn.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.04% · €31m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.06%
€42m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−0.02%
€14m
Hosting refugeesD
+<0.01%
€4m
Azerbaijan kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD
−<0.01%
€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 2.5% · €1.8bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−1.8%
€1.3bn
Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD
−0.61%
€425m
Azerbaijan earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.06%
€40m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.03%
€21m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.02%
€17m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD
+0.02%
€17m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.02%
€16m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−0.02%
€11m
Azerbaijan's companies made more profit in RussiaD
−0.01%
€8m
Azerbaijan kept more from selling to RussiaD
−0.01%
€8m
Azerbaijan kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€0.66bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €1.7bn from Russia in 2021 and €3.2bn in 2025 (+89%). It sold €0.73bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.94bn in 2025 (+29%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 17.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Azerbaijan: €16m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2025. Remittances from Russia changed by −0.60% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: −€423m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely −€1.2bn to +€301m); migrants sent €2.3bn home from Russia in that time. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Azerbaijan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€2.3bn
€2.2bnrange €1.9bn to €2.5bn
€2bn
A
Oil products
€0.94bn
€0.92bnrange €0.78bn to €1.1bn
€31m
C (estimate)
Pipeline gas
€0.17bn
€0.17bnrange €0.15bn to €0.19bn
not tracked
A
Other goods
€10bn
€9.8bn
–
All goods
€13.4bn
€13.1bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Azerbaijan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Azerbaijan. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.22bn extra from 2022 (0.32% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.27bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Refugees from Ukraine
5,043 refugees from Ukraine, 0.5 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €4m (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Azerbaijan: €4m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €0.43bn (0.61% of one year's GDP).
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €17m (0.02% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €10m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €6m to €15m); €0 in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 9 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion: number 4 of 4 members toward Russia.
34 sources back its parts: 11 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 2% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 70% modelled (C) and 28% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −2.5% of one year's GDP (likely 0.82% to 4.1% toward Russia; very likely · 99%). Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.8bn (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Azerbaijan trade with Russia?
It bought €3.2bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.7bn in 2021), and sold €0.94bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.8bn (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war.
Azerbaijan–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €3.2bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.7bn in 2021), and sold €0.94bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €31m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −2.5% of one year's GDP (likely 0.82% to 4.1% toward Russia; very likely · 99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does Azerbaijan help Russia get around sanctions?
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €10m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €6m to €15m); €0 in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
How much has Azerbaijan given to Ukraine?
Azerbaijan's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €31m, 0.04% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.13% below zero to 0.10% above zero). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
How does Azerbaijan compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Armenia −0.17%, Azerbaijan −2.5%, Türkiye −3.1%, Georgia −4.1%. In the map's ranking: number 9 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
Does Azerbaijan have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of Azerbaijan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Azerbaijan.
War Balance