Is Uzbekistan helping Russia? What the money flows show
Uzbekistan's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€3m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Uzbekistan moved €4.1bn (4.1% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Uzbekistan kept more from selling to Russia). The net is 4.1% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 1.7% to 6.8% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
likely 1.7% to 6.8% toward Russia · €4.1bn · ≈ 0.88%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 4.1% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€3m
likely from 0.09% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
4.1%
€4.1bn
likely 1.7% to 6.8% toward Russia very likely · >99%
Uzbekistan moved €4.1bn (4.1% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Uzbekistan kept more from selling to Russia).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 3.4% of GDP more (€3.4bn; likely 1.2% to 5.4% toward Russia)
Uzbekistan's own gain from trade with Russia: Uzbekistan kept 0.68% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€679m; likely 0.17% to 2.4% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €160m (0.16% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €495m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 57% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €4.2bn in 2021, €6.5bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 85% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.5bn in 2021, €2.7bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €3m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€4m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+<0.01%
€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 4.1% · €4.1bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−2.8%
€2.8bn
Uzbekistan earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.54%
€543m
Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD
−0.26%
€261m
Russia kept more from its nuclear projects and loansD
−0.21%
€210m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.16%
€160m
Uzbekistan kept more from selling to RussiaC
−0.08%
€82m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.05%
€50m
Uzbekistan kept more from settling Russia's tradeD
−0.04%
€40m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.02%
€20m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−0.01%
€12m
Uzbekistan's companies made more profit in RussiaD
−<0.01%
€8m
Uzbekistan kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€6m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD
+<0.01%
€3m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€1.5bn.
It bought €4.2bn from Russia in 2021 and €6.5bn in 2025 (+57%). It sold €1.5bn to Russia in 2021 and €2.7bn in 2025 (+85%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 9.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Uzbekistan: €160m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. Depends on wages earned in Russia: remittances from Russia changed by +18.8% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: +€18.9bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely +€9.2bn to +€24.7bn); migrants sent €45.5bn home from Russia in that time. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Uzbekistan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€0.85bn
€0.77bnrange €0.66bn to €0.88bn
not tracked
C (estimate)
Oil products
€4.3bn
€3.9bnrange €3.4bn to €4.5bn
not tracked
C (estimate)
Pipeline gas
€1.6bn
€1.5bnrange €1.3bn to €1.7bn
not tracked
C (estimate)
Other goods
€24.4bn
€22.3bn
–
All goods
€31.3bn
€28.4bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Uzbekistan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Uzbekistan. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.50bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €0.26bn (0.26% of one year's GDP).
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Uzbekistan kept more from settling Russia's trade: €40m (0.04% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €20m (0.02% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €22m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €18m to €42m); €5m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 6 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. Central Asia: number 2 of 2 members toward Russia. Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion: number 2 of 4 members toward Russia.
33 sources back its parts: 9 official statistics, 7 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 74% modelled (C) and 26% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −4.1% of one year's GDP (likely 1.7% to 6.8% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Uzbekistan moved €4.1bn (4.1% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Uzbekistan kept more from selling to Russia). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Uzbekistan trade with Russia?
It bought €6.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€4.2bn in 2021), and sold €2.7bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Uzbekistan moved €4.1bn (4.1% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Uzbekistan kept more from selling to Russia).
Uzbekistan–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €6.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€4.2bn in 2021), and sold €2.7bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €3m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −4.1% of one year's GDP (likely 1.7% to 6.8% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does Uzbekistan help Russia get around sanctions?
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €22m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €18m to €42m); €5m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
How does Uzbekistan compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Turkmenistan +1.5%, Kazakhstan +0.02%, Tajikistan −0.40%, Afghanistan −1.5%, Uzbekistan −4.1%, Kyrgyzstan −10.0%. In the map's ranking: number 6 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
We found no sanctions of Uzbekistan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Uzbekistan.
War Balance