Is Tunisia helping Russia? What the money flows show
Tunisia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €7m (0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €2.1bn (4.6% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 4.6% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 1.1% to 7.2% toward Russia; very likely · 98%).
likely 1.1% to 7.2% toward Russia · €2.1bn · ≈ 0.99%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 4.6% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 98%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.02%
€7m
likely from 0.25% below zero to 0.09% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
4.6%
€2.1bn
likely 1.1% to 7.2% toward Russia very likely · 98%
Russia kept €2.1bn (4.6% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 4.7% of GDP more (€2.1bn; likely 1.1% to 7.3% toward Russia)
Tunisia's own gain from trade with Russia: Tunisia kept 0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€6m; likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €152m (0.34% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €77m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 289% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €431m in 2021, €1.7bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €1.9bn of the net's €2.1bn.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.02% · €7m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.02%
€8m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 4.6% · €2.1bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−4.2%
€1.9bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.34%
€152m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.15%
€67m
Tunisia kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.02%
€7m
Russia kept more from services sold hereC
−<0.01%
€1m
Tunisia kept more from selling to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€0.69bn.
It bought €0.43bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.7bn in 2025 (+289%). It sold €18m to Russia in 2021 and €40m in 2025 (+128%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 33.8% of what it bought from Russia. For Tunisia: €152m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Tunisia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€0.42bn
€0.34bnrange €0.25bn to €0.45bn
€35m
C (estimate)
Oil products
€4.5bn
€4.1bnrange €3.1bn to €5.3bn
€6.8bn
C (estimate)
Coal
€0m
€0m
€3m
–
Other goods
€2.8bn
€2.6bn
–
All goods
€7.8bn
€7.1bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: B, 2024: A, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Tunisia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Tunisia. Checked 27 October 2026.
22 sources back its parts: 4 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 97% modelled (C) and 3% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −4.6% of one year's GDP (likely 1.1% to 7.2% toward Russia; very likely · 98%). Chance toward Russia: 98%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €2.1bn (4.6% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Tunisia trade with Russia?
It bought €1.7bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.43bn in 2021), and sold €40m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €2.1bn (4.6% of GDP) more than without the war.
How much has Tunisia given to Ukraine?
Tunisia's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €7m, 0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.25% below zero to 0.09% above zero). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
How does Tunisia compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Algeria +0.02%, Tunisia −4.6%, Libya −6.6%. In the map's ranking: number 5 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
We found no sanctions of Tunisia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Tunisia.
War Balance