Is Yemen helping Russia? What the money flows show
Yemen's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€3m (−0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €459m (5.2% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 5.2% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 1.4% to 8.6% toward Russia; very likely · 99%).
likely 1.4% to 8.6% toward Russia · €462m · ≈ 1.1%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 5.2% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.03%
€3m
likely from 0.99% below zero to 0.36% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
5.2%
€459m
likely 1.4% to 8.5% toward Russia very likely · 99%
Russia kept €459m (5.2% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 5.2% of GDP more (€459m; likely 1.4% to 8.5% toward Russia)
Yemen's own gain from trade with Russia: Yemen kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €120m (1.4% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €26m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €328m of the net's €462m.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.03% · €3m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−0.03%
€3m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 5.2% · €459m
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−3.7%
€328m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−1.4%
€120m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.12%
€10m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€0.18bn.
It bought €0.21bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.34bn in 2025 (+64%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 4.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Yemen: €120m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Yemen's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
€0.90bn
€0.79bnrange €0.45bn to €1.2bn
€1.2bn
C (estimate)
Other goods
€0.53bn
€0.82bn
–
All goods
€1.4bn
€1.6bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: A, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Yemen's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Yemen. Checked 27 October 2026.
15 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 98% modelled (C) and 2% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (95%) counts
Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −5.2% of one year's GDP (likely 1.4% to 8.6% toward Russia; very likely · 99%). Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €459m (5.2% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Yemen trade with Russia?
It bought €0.34bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.21bn in 2021). What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €459m (5.2% of GDP) more than without the war.
How does Yemen compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Saudi Arabia −0.30%, Oman −1.4%, Yemen −5.2%. In the map's ranking: number 4 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
We found no sanctions of Yemen's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Yemen.
War Balance