War Balance
Central Asia: each country's money toward Ukraine or Russia since 2022
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, from 2022 to August 2026: Russia kept €5bn more from trade with them together than without the war. The net is 1.2% of their combined GDP toward Russia.
These numbers measure money: aid to Ukraine and the change in what Russia keeps from trade, against a world without the war. Weapons count at their money value: aid at market value when delivered, weapons and troops sent to Russia at the seller's gain where Russia paid and in full where it did not. Votes, diplomacy and intent are not in them.
Totals: the 5 members' best estimates added up, and as a share of their combined GDP. Each member's range and chance are on its row.
Members · 5
Sorted by “Net” as a share of one year's GDP, from the Ukraine side to the Russia side, 2022 to August 2026. + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia; + adds to its support for Ukraine, − takes from it; more or less: how much more or less Russia kept (taxes and profit, not sales) than in a world without the war.
| # | Country | Net | Support for Ukraine | Russia kept from trade, vs no war |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Turkmenistan | +1.5%+€0.57bn · +€77 per personlikely from 0.91% toward Russia to 7.6% toward Ukrainelikely toward Ukraine · 83% | −€4m−0.01% of GDPessentially zero | €0.58bn less1.5% of GDP lesslikely toward Ukraine · 84% |
| 2 | Kazakhstan | +0.02%+€55m · +€3 per personlikely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraineessentially zero | +€20m<0.01% of GDPessentially zero | €35m less0.01% of GDP lessessentially zero |
| 3 | Tajikistan | −0.40%−€46m · −€4 per personlikely from 4.3% toward Russia to 4.5% toward Ukrainetoo close to call · 58% toward Russia | −€1m<0.01% of GDPessentially zero | €46m more0.39% of GDP moretoo close to call · 58% toward Russia |
| 4 | Uzbekistan | −4.1%−€4.1bn · −€113 per personlikely 1.7% to 6.8% toward Russiavery likely · >99% | −€3m<0.01% of GDPessentially zero | €4.1bn more4.1% of GDP morevery likely · >99% |
| 5 | Kyrgyzstan | −10.0%−€1.4bn · −€196 per personlikely 0.77% to 18.7% toward Russiavery likely · 97% | −€1m<0.01% of GDPessentially zero | €1.4bn more10.0% of GDP morevery likely · 97% |
Each row: the best estimate, then its range and the chance of its direction, as in the country's panel.
Questions
Is Central Asia helping Russia?
In money terms the 5 together come to 1.2% of their combined GDP toward Russia. Very likely toward Russia: Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Direction likely, too close to call or near zero: Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Goods re-exported to Russia through them count for the countries that made them.
Related
Ranking · Support for Ukraine by country · Trade with Russia by country · All topics · How it works
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/group/central-asia/