Is Turkmenistan helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine
Turkmenistan's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€4m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €578m (1.5% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 1.5% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.91% toward Russia to 7.6% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 83%).
likely from 0.91% toward Russia to 7.6% toward Ukraine · €574m · ≈ 0.33%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 1.5% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 83%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.01%
€4m
likely from 0.11% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
1.5%
€578m
likely from 0.89% toward Russia to 7.7% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 84%
Russia kept €578m (1.5% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 1.6% of GDP less (€589m; likely from 0.86% toward Russia to 7.7% toward Ukraine)
Turkmenistan's own gain from trade with Russia: Turkmenistan kept 0.03% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€11m; likely from 0.30% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €123m (0.33% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Bought 92% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €656m in 2021, €1.3bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €698m of the net's €574m.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 83%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 83% smaller, the direction would flip.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · €4m
Turkmenistan kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€2m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€1m
Turkmenistan kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD
−<0.01%
€1m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 1.5% · €578m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+1.9%
€698m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.33%
€123m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.06%
€23m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.03%
€10m
Turkmenistan kept more from selling to RussiaC
−0.02%
€8m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD
+<0.01%
€2m
Turkmenistan's companies made more profit in RussiaD
−<0.01%
€2m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−<0.01%
€1m
Turkmenistan kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€0.17bn.
It bought €0.66bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.3bn in 2025 (+92%). It sold €90m to Russia in 2021 and €0.35bn in 2025 (+290%). For Turkmenistan: €123m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Turkmenistan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Turkmenistan. Checked 27 October 2026.
26 sources back its parts: 6 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 98% modelled (C) and 2% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (97%) counts
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, imf, mirror
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
It bought €1.3bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.66bn in 2021), and sold €0.35bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €578m (1.5% of GDP) less than without the war.
What decides Turkmenistan's number?
Chance toward Ukraine: 83%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 83% smaller, the direction would flip.
Is Turkmenistan helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +1.5% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.91% toward Russia to 7.6% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 83%). Chance toward Ukraine: 83%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €578m (1.5% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How does Turkmenistan compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Turkmenistan +1.5%, Kazakhstan +0.02%, Afghanistan −1.5%, Uzbekistan −4.1%.
We found no sanctions of Turkmenistan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Turkmenistan.
War Balance