Kazakhstan vs Uzbekistan: support for Ukraine and trade with Russia since 2022
Kazakhstan: Toward Ukraine by 0.02% of a year's GDP since 2022 (likely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Uzbekistan: Toward Russia by 4.1% of a year's GDP since 2022 (likely 1.7% to 6.8% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
Support for Ukraine in euros: Kazakhstan €20m, Uzbekistan €3m. More in euros: Kazakhstan; more as a share of GDP: Kazakhstan.
These numbers measure money: aid to Ukraine and the change in what Russia keeps from trade, against a world without the war. Weapons count at their money value: aid at market value when delivered, weapons and troops sent to Russia at the seller's gain where Russia paid and in full where it did not. Votes, diplomacy and intent are not in them.
Side by side
| # | Country | Net | Support for Ukraine | Russia kept from trade, vs no war | Paid Russia since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kazakhstan | +0.02%+€55m · +€3 per personlikely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraineessentially zero | +€20m<0.01% of GDPessentially zero | €35m less0.01% of GDP lessessentially zero | €78.7bn32.5% of GDP | |
| Uzbekistan | −4.1%−€4.1bn · −€113 per personlikely 1.7% to 6.8% toward Russiavery likely · >99% | −€3m<0.01% of GDPessentially zero | €4.1bn more4.1% of GDP morevery likely · >99% | €31.2bn31.1% of GDP |
Each row: the best estimate, then its range and the chance of its direction, as in the country's panel.
What makes up each number
| Measure | Kazakhstan | Uzbekistan |
|---|---|---|
| Purchases from Ukraine vs no war | +€14m<0.01% of GDP | −€4m<0.01% of GDP |
| Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine | +€4m<0.01% of GDP | – |
| Extra services sold to Ukraine | −€2m<0.01% of GDP | – |
| Government aid to Ukraine | +€2m<0.01% of GDP | +€1m<0.01% of GDP |
| Cost of hosting refugees from Ukraine | +€2m<0.01% of GDP | – |
| Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold | +€2.6bn+1.1% of GDP | −€2.8bn−2.8% of GDP |
| Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices | −€1.2bn−0.50% of GDP | −€0.16bn−0.16% of GDP |
| Profits of Russian-owned companies abroad | −€0.69bn−0.28% of GDP | −€0.26bn−0.26% of GDP |
| Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions | −€0.64bn−0.26% of GDP | −€0.54bn−0.54% of GDP |
| Payment agents settling Russia's trade | −€0.14bn−0.06% of GDP | −€40m−0.04% of GDP |
| Services bought from Russia | +€0.12bn+0.05% of GDP | +€50m+0.05% of GDP |
| Company profits in Russia | −€38m−0.02% of GDP | −€8m<0.01% of GDP |
| Russian oil bought via other countries | −€35m−0.01% of GDP | −€20m−0.02% of GDP |
| Company taxes paid in Russia | −€32m−0.01% of GDP | −€12m−0.01% of GDP |
| Sellers' gain on sales to Russia | +€19m<0.01% of GDP | −€82m−0.08% of GDP |
| Services sold to Russia | +€14m<0.01% of GDP | −€6m<0.01% of GDP |
| Weapons bought from Russia | +€13m<0.01% of GDP | +€3m<0.01% of GDP |
| Shipping and insuring Russian oil | −€1m<0.01% of GDP | – |
| Rosatom projects and Russian state loans | – | −€0.21bn−0.21% of GDP |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia
Year by year
| Year | Country | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Kazakhstan | +€2m | −€332m | −€330m |
| Uzbekistan | −€1m | −€310m | −€310m | |
| 2023 | Kazakhstan | +€5m | +€254m | +€258m |
| Uzbekistan | −€2m | −€496m | −€497m | |
| 2024 | Kazakhstan | +€4m | −€367m | −€363m |
| Uzbekistan | −€3m | −€1.5bn | −€1.5bn | |
| 2025 | Kazakhstan | +€7m | +€67m | +€74m |
| Uzbekistan | −€1m | −€807m | −€808m | |
| 2026* | Kazakhstan | +€2m | +€413m | +€415m |
| Uzbekistan | +€3m | −€992m | −€990m |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/compare/kazakhstan-vs-uzbekistan/