Japan's support for Ukraine since 2022: €5.3bn (0.13% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €6.5bn (0.16% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €0.34bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 0.30% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.14% to 0.55% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.30% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less went beyond what sanctions required.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.13%
€5.3bn
likely 0.12% to 0.27% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.16%
€6.5bn
likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.36% toward Ukraine near zero · 94% toward Ukraine
Russia kept €6.5bn (0.16% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.17% of GDP less (€6.8bn; likely 0.03% to 0.36% toward Ukraine)
Japan's own gain from trade with Russia: Japan kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€278m; likely from 0.08% toward Russia to 0.06% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% of GDP in returns (€344m).
Its story in short
Cut beyond what sanctions required Of the €7.9bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 5% was required by sanctions it set itself (import bans of April 2022 and later, the G7 oil phase-out), 95% went beyond them.
Bought 58% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €10.9bn in 2021, €4.5bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 58% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €6.7bn in 2021, €2.8bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.13% · €5.3bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+0.12%
€4.9bn
Private donationsD
+<0.01%
€353m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€124m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€54m
Hosting refugeesD
+<0.01%
€34m
Japan kept part of others' aid, spent hereD
−<0.01%
€1m
Japan kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)D
−<0.01%
€1m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.16% · €6.5bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.19%
€7.8bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.08%
€3.2bn
Its firms paid Russia less taxC
+0.06%
€2.4bn
Japan earned more from Russian oil and gas stakesC
−0.04%
€1.7bn
Japan's companies made less profit in RussiaC
+0.04%
€1.6bn
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−<0.01%
€212m
Japan kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€191m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€71m
Japan kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€15m
Japan kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€13m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% in returns · €344m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+<0.01%
€317m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+<0.01%
€27m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€3.8bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €1.1bn in 2022 to €0.37bn in 2025.
It bought €10.9bn from Russia in 2021 and €4.5bn in 2025 (−58%). It sold €6.7bn to Russia in 2021 and €2.8bn in 2025 (−58%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 65.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Japan: €3.2bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Japan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€1.5bn
€1.2bnrange €1.1bn to €1.3bn
€1.1bn
A
Oil products
€0.18bn
€0.51bnrange €0.40bn to €0.61bn
€0.19bn
A
LNG
€16.9bn
€15.4bnrange €14.1bn to €16.8bn
€15.8bn
A
Coal
€4.5bn
€4.1bnrange €3.8bn to €4.5bn
€2.8bn
A
Other goods
€11.2bn
€10.6bn
–
All goods
€34.3bn
€31.9bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 5% required by sanctions it set itself, 95% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. Japan has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 26 February 2022. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Japan as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Japan. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €2.9bn extra from 2022 (0.07% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.11bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: <0.01% of a year's GDP (€344m; likely €172m to €646m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure (estimate: about €28bn); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: no public figure.
Refugees from Ukraine
2,346 refugees from Ukraine, 0.0 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €34m (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Japan: €35m spent on refugees, less €1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €14.4bn; counted here: €4.9bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; G7 loans repaid from Russian assets left out (Russia pays for them); military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €10.2bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0m. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €3.9bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €6m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€0.69bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Japan; what its firms kept of it, €1m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Its firms paid Russia less tax: €2.4bn (0.06% of one year's GDP). Japan earned more from Russian oil and gas stakes: €1.7bn (0.04% of one year's GDP). Japan's companies made less profit in Russia: €1.6bn (0.04% of one year's GDP). Russia took €2.6bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €1.8bn to €3.9bn; 0.06% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.21bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Japan kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.19bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €38m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €35m to €157m); €96m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 31 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. G7: number 7 of 7 members toward Ukraine.
In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP
40 sources back its parts: 12 official statistics, 9 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 96% modelled (C) and 4% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
In money terms: it bought €4.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€10.9bn in 2021), and sold €2.8bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €5.3bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +0.30% of one year's GDP (likely 0.14% to 0.55% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Is Japan helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.30% of one year's GDP (likely 0.14% to 0.55% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €6.5bn (0.16% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Japan still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 65.5% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €4.5bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €10.9bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
How much has Japan given to Ukraine?
Japan's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €5.3bn, 0.13% of one year's GDP (likely 0.12% to 0.27%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Japan trade with Russia?
It bought €4.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€10.9bn in 2021), and sold €2.8bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €6.5bn (0.16% of GDP) less than without the war.
Did Japan cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 5% required by sanctions it set itself, 95% beyond what sanctions required.
War Balance