Is Brunei helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine
Brunei's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €453m (3.1% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 3.1% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 8.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 85%).
likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 8.4% toward Ukraine · €453m · ≈ 0.66%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 3.1% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
3.1%
€453m
likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 8.4% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 85%
Russia kept €453m (3.1% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 3.1% of GDP less (€453m; likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 8.4% toward Ukraine)
Brunei's own gain from trade with Russia: Brunei kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €542m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 3.1% · €453m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+1.8%
€261m
Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC
+1.5%
€221m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.20%
€29m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€0.24bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €0.49bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.62bn in 2025 (+26%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 99.9% of what it bought from Russia. For Brunei: €221m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2026. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Brunei's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€2.9bn
€1.2bnrange €0.80bn to €2.1bn
€2bn
C (estimate)
Oil products
€1.2bn
€0.47bnrange €0.35bn to €0.66bn
€0.85bn
C (estimate)
Coal
€0m
€0m
€8m
–
Other goods
€1m
€7m
–
All goods
€4.1bn
€1.7bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: B, 2025: B, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Brunei's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Brunei. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €46m extra from 2022 (0.31% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.54bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €29m (0.20% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
11 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 94% modelled (C) and 6% rough indications (D). No data: Sales to Russia. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
It bought €0.62bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.49bn in 2021). What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €453m (3.1% of GDP) less than without the war.
Is Brunei helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +3.1% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 8.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 85%). Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €453m (3.1% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How does Brunei compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Brunei +3.1%, Malaysia −0.64%.
We found no sanctions of Brunei's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Brunei.