How much has Chile given to Ukraine since 2022?

Q: How much has Chile given to Ukraine?

Almost nothing that can be measured: €5m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).

Q: How does Chile compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Bolivia +0.44%, Peru +0.07%, Argentina +0.05%, Chile +0.04%. In the map's ranking: number 32 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP.

Q: Where do the numbers for Chile come from?

24 sources back its parts, 8 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

Q: Does Chile have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Chile's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Chile.

Chile's support for Ukraine since 2022: €5m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €102m (0.03% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€89m of €102m). The net is 0.04% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely <0.01% to 0.10% toward Ukraine; very likely · 99%).

Open in the map →

Toward Ukraine by

0.04% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · 99%

likely <0.01% to 0.10% toward Ukraine · €107m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.04% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

€5m

likely from <0.01% below zero to 0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.03%

€102m

likely <0.01% to 0.10% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €102m (0.03% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€89m of €102m).

Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.03% of GDP less (€98m; likely <0.01% to 0.09% toward Ukraine)
Chile's own gain from trade with Russia: Chile kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€4m; likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Its story in short

Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €5m

Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC	+<0.01%	€5m
Hosting refugeesD	+<0.01%	€1m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC	−<0.01%	€1m

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.03% · €102m

Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesC	+0.03%	€89m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC	+<0.01%	€18m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC	−<0.01%	€10m
Chile kept less from selling to RussiaC	+<0.01%	€6m
Chile kept more from services sold to RussiaC	−<0.01%	€2m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€45m.

Year	Support for Ukraine	Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)	Net	Net since 2022
2022	+€1m	+€45m	+€45m	+0.02%
2023	+€2m	+€29m	+€31m	+0.03%
2024	+€2m	+€1m	+€3m	+0.03%
2025	+<€1m	+€15m	+€15m	+0.03%
2026*	+€1m	+€11m	+€12m	+0.04%

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

Support for Ukraine by type

Chile's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

Military aid	–
Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share)	€5mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €5m
Refugee hosting	€1m
Private donations and purchases	−€1m
Support for Ukraine (the map's figure)	€5m

Quality of the split: A No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

Military aid to Ukraine, every country →

Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.16bn from Russia in 2021 and €18m in 2025 (−89%). It sold €0.52bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.44bn in 2025 (−16%). For Chile: €10m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Chile's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Chile. Checked 27 October 2026.

Every country's sanctions on Russia →

The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €57m extra from 2022 (0.02% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 32 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP.

Neighbours by land

Country	Net, % of GDP
Bolivia	+0.44%+€0.22bnlikely toward Ukraine · 82%
Peru	+0.07%+€0.19bnessentially zero
Argentina	+0.05%+€0.31bnessentially zero
Chile	+0.04%+€0.11bnvery likely · 99%

In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

Country	Net, % of GDP
United States	+0.51%+€132bnvery likely · >99%
Canada	+0.51%+€10.6bnvery likely · >99%

How the number is backed

24 sources back its parts: 8 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 11 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 99% modelled (C) and 1% rough indications (D).

Data coverage

Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

Sources, by part

Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries C

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

Chile kept less from selling to Russia C

official GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition

Its share of IMF and World Bank loans C

research Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding

Every source of its parts (24)

Questions

Is Chile helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.04% of one year's GDP (likely <0.01% to 0.10% toward Ukraine; very likely · 99%). Chance toward Ukraine: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €102m (0.03% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€89m of €102m). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.