Is Austria helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine
Austria's support for Ukraine since 2022: €3.7bn (0.79% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Austria moved €2.4bn (0.51% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Austria kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€4.1bn; the other parts take €1.7bn off it)); Russia also lost €0.81bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 0.45% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 1.2% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 68%).
likely from 1.2% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine · €2.1bn · ≈ 0.10%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.45% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine.
Chance toward Ukraine: 68%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.79%
€3.7bn
likely 0.60% to 1.1% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.51%
€2.4bn
likely from 2.1% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 67%
Austria moved €2.4bn (0.51% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Austria kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€4.1bn; the other parts take €1.7bn off it)).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.36% of GDP more (€1.7bn; likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine)
Austria's own gain from trade with Russia: Austria kept 0.15% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€723m; likely from 0.57% toward Russia to 0.20% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.17% of GDP in returns (€814m).
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €4.1bn (0.87% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Bought 98% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €3.3bn in 2021, €70m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.17% of a year's GDP (€814m; likely €568m to €1.1bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Its firms still pay tax in Russia Its firms paid Russia €2.3bn (0.49% of GDP) more tax than without the war.
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 68%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 52% larger, the direction would flip.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.79% · €3.7bn
Hosting refugeesC
+0.39%
€1.8bn
Its share of EU aidB
+0.31%
€1.5bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.05%
€248m
Private donationsD
+0.03%
€136m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.01%
€52m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€21m
Austria kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€11m
Austria kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€5m
Austria kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)D
−<0.01%
€4m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.51% · €2.4bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.87%
€4.1bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.81%
€3.8bn
Its firms paid Russia more taxC
−0.49%
€2.3bn
Austria's companies made more profit in RussiaB
−0.35%
€1.6bn
Austria earned less from Russian oil and gas stakesD
+0.19%
€904m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.15%
€708m
Russian owners kept less from their firms hereD
+0.03%
€125m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.02%
€73m
Austria earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−<0.01%
€42m
Austria kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€38m
Austria kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€15m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.17% in returns · €814m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyD
+0.09%
€428m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.08%
€385m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€3.3bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.82bn in 2022 to €0.70bn in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €3.3bn from Russia in 2021 and €70m in 2025 (−98%). It sold €2.1bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.1bn in 2025 (−47%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 77.0% of what it bought from Russia. For Austria: €4.1bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 98% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Austria's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€68m
€66mrange €38m to €85m
€70m
A
Oil products
€0.41bn
€0.40bnrange €0.25bn to €0.53bn
€50m
A
Pipeline gas
€11.1bn
€10.6bnrange €6.6bn to €14.1bn
€10.7bn
A
Coal
€39m
€36mrange €22m to €55m
not tracked
B
Other goods
€0.98bn
€0.94bn
–
All goods
€12.6bn
€12bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: B, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Yes. As an EU member, Austria applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Austria as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Austria. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €1.4bn extra from 2022 (0.30% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.17% of a year's GDP (€814m; likely €568m to €1.1bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure; assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €1.5bn (2024, source).
Refugees from Ukraine
91,620 refugees from Ukraine, 10.0 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €1.8bn (0.39% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Austria: €1.9bn spent on refugees, less €47m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €260m; counted here: €248m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount. Loans, full amount: €2.1bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.95bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €2.7bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €227m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€0.45bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Austria; what its firms kept of it, €20m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Its firms paid Russia more tax: €2.3bn (0.49% of one year's GDP). Austria's companies made more profit in Russia: €1.6bn (0.35% of one year's GDP). Austria earned less from Russian oil and gas stakes: €0.90bn (0.19% of one year's GDP). Russian owners kept less from their firms here: €0.12bn (0.03% of one year's GDP). Russia took €5.4bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €4.7bn to €6.3bn; 1.1% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.71bn (0.15% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €20m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €19m to €69m); €45m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
43 sources back its parts: 14 official statistics, 9 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 16 method inputs. By size, 18% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 67% modelled (C) and 15% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Austria's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €3.7bn, 0.79% of one year's GDP (likely 0.60% to 1.1%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Austria trade with Russia?
It bought €70m from Russia in 2025 (€3.3bn in 2021), and sold €1.1bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Austria moved €2.4bn (0.51% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Austria kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€4.1bn; the other parts take €1.7bn off it)).
Does Austria still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 77.0% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €70m of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €3.3bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Is Austria helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.45% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.2% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 68%). Chance toward Ukraine: 68%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Austria moved €2.4bn (0.51% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Austria kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€4.1bn; the other parts take €1.7bn off it)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How much did Austria give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €0.82bn; 2023 €0.93bn; 2024 €0.85bn; 2025 €0.70bn; 2026 (to August) €0.44bn. In total since 2022: €3.7bn (likely 0.60% to 1.1%).
What decides Austria's number?
Chance toward Ukraine: 68%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 52% larger, the direction would flip.
War Balance