Is Lebanon helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine
Lebanon's support for Ukraine since 2022: €40m (0.19% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €538m (2.6% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 2.8% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 1.5% toward Russia to 13.8% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 84%).
likely from 1.5% toward Russia to 13.8% toward Ukraine · €578m · ≈ 0.59%/yr
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 2.8% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 84%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.19%
€40m
likely from 0.24% below zero to 0.44% above zero near zero · 77% above zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
2.6%
€538m
likely from 1.6% toward Russia to 13.6% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 82%
Russia kept €538m (2.6% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 2.6% of GDP less (€538m; likely from 1.6% toward Russia to 13.6% toward Ukraine)
Lebanon's own gain from trade with Russia: Lebanon kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €234m (1.1% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €21m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €700m of the net's €578m.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 84%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 83% smaller, the direction would flip.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.19% · €40m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.19%
€40m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 2.6% · €538m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+3.4%
€700m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−1.1%
€234m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.35%
€73m
Russia kept more from services sold hereC
−<0.01%
€1m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€0.16bn.
It bought €0.47bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.40bn in 2025 (−14%). It sold €10m to Russia in 2021 and €6m in 2025 (−42%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 81.3% of what it bought from Russia. For Lebanon: €234m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Lebanon's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
€1.3bn
€1bnrange €0.68bn to €1.4bn
€0.96bn
C (estimate)
Coal
€13m
€11mrange €8m to €14m
€9m
C (estimate)
Other goods
€0.62bn
€0.51bn
–
All goods
€1.9bn
€1.5bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Lebanon's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Lebanon. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.17bn extra from 2022 (0.79% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €21m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€18m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Lebanon; what its firms kept of it, <€1m, is taken off its support.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €73m (0.35% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
19 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 9 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 93% modelled (C) and 7% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (97%) counts
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
It bought €0.40bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.47bn in 2021), and sold €6m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €538m (2.6% of GDP) less than without the war.
What decides Lebanon's number?
Chance toward Ukraine: 84%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 83% smaller, the direction would flip.
Is Lebanon helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +2.8% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.5% toward Russia to 13.8% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 84%). Chance toward Ukraine: 84%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €538m (2.6% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How much has Lebanon given to Ukraine?
Lebanon's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €40m, 0.19% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.24% below zero to 0.44% above zero). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
How does Lebanon compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Lebanon +2.8%, Israel +<0.01%, Syria −1.0%.
We found no sanctions of Lebanon's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Lebanon.
War Balance