Nigeria's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€50m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.9bn (0.43% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere: structural (Dangote refinery and EU ban) (€1.4bn of €1.9bn). The net is 0.42% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.04% to 0.80% toward Ukraine; very likely · 96%).
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.42% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 96%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.01%
€50m
likely from 0.04% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.43%
€1.9bn
likely 0.06% to 0.81% toward Ukraine very likely · 96%
Russia kept €1.9bn (0.43% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere: structural (Dangote refinery and EU ban) (€1.4bn of €1.9bn).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.43% of GDP less (€1.9bn; likely 0.06% to 0.81% toward Ukraine)
Nigeria's own gain from trade with Russia: Nigeria kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1m; about 0)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Bought 77% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.7bn in 2021, €387m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Rough data: mostly estimates 68% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
Mostly one part Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €1.4bn of the net's €1.8bn.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · €50m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−0.01%
€57m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€8m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.43% · €1.9bn
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.32%
€1.4bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.12%
€531m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−<0.01%
€40m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€3m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD
+<0.01%
€2m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2025: +€0.50bn.
It bought €1.7bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.39bn in 2025 (−77%). It sold €4m to Russia in 2021 and €8m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 17.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Nigeria: €40m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Nigeria's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
€1.9bn
€1.8bnrange €1.2bn to €2.6bn
€3bn
C (estimate)
Coal
€0m
€0m
€2m
–
Other goods
€1.4bn
€1.1bn
–
All goods
€3.3bn
€2.9bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Nigeria's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Nigeria. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €30m. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€26m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Nigeria; what its firms kept of it, <€1m, is taken off its support.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €1.4bn (0.32% of one year's GDP). Less fuel made from Russian crude bought from EU refiners: this fell when the EU banned Russian-made fuel (2023) and the country's own Dangote refinery started production (2024). A structural change in supply, not a policy.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 30 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP.
19 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 9 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 32% modelled (C) and 68% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Sources, by part
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries D
It bought €0.39bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.7bn in 2021), and sold €8m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.9bn (0.43% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere: structural (Dangote refinery and EU ban) (€1.4bn of €1.9bn).
Is Nigeria helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.42% of one year's GDP (likely 0.04% to 0.80% toward Ukraine; very likely · 96%). Chance toward Ukraine: 96%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.9bn (0.43% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere: structural (Dangote refinery and EU ban) (€1.4bn of €1.9bn). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How does Nigeria compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Cameroon +0.99%, Nigeria +0.42%, Niger −<0.01%, Benin −0.36%. In the map's ranking: number 30 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP.
We found no sanctions of Nigeria's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Nigeria.
War Balance