How much has Switzerland given to Ukraine since 2022?
Switzerland's support for Ukraine since 2022: €8.3bn (0.97% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.6bn (0.18% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.5bn of €1.6bn); Russia also lost €2bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 1.0% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.44% to 1.4% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 1.0% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Toward Russia: mostly war-time prices on gas contracts.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.97%
€8.3bn
likely 0.82% to 1.2% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.18%
€1.6bn
likely from 0.73% toward Russia to 0.15% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 86%
Russia kept €1.6bn (0.18% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.5bn of €1.6bn).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.26% of GDP more (€2.2bn; likely from 0.79% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine)
Switzerland's own gain from trade with Russia: Switzerland kept 0.07% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€618m; likely from 0.07% toward Russia to 0.16% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.23% of GDP in returns (€2.0bn).
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €1.5bn (0.17% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Bought 67% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.7bn in 2021, €2.8bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.23% of a year's GDP (€2.0bn; likely €1.5bn to €2.2bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Mostly one part Hosting refugees: €6.5bn of the net's €8.7bn.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.97% · €8.3bn
Hosting refugeesC
+0.76%
€6.5bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.16%
€1.4bn
Private donationsC
+0.07%
€567m
Switzerland kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−0.02%
€141m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€29m
Switzerland kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)D
−<0.01%
€5m
Switzerland kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€4m
Switzerland kept part of others' aid, spent hereD
−<0.01%
€1m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.18% · €1.6bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.17%
€1.5bn
Switzerland's companies made less profit in RussiaC
+0.07%
€575m
Russia kept more from gold and hidden paymentsD
−0.06%
€498m
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−0.06%
€492m
Its firms paid Russia less taxC
+0.04%
€343m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.02%
€199m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.01%
€122m
Switzerland kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.01%
€116m
Switzerland earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.01%
€100m
Switzerland kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€50m
Switzerland kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€23m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.23% in returns · €2.0bn
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.13%
€1.1bn
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereC
+0.10%
€846m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€2.1bn. Support for Ukraine rose from €1.6bn in 2022 to €1.7bn in 2025.
It bought €1.7bn from Russia in 2021 and €2.8bn in 2025 (+67%). It sold €3.1bn to Russia in 2021 and €2.5bn in 2025 (−19%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 26.2% of what it bought from Russia. For Switzerland: €1.5bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023, 100% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Switzerland's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Pipeline gas
€0.62bn
€0.59bnrange €0.31bn to €0.95bn
€0.13bn
A
Other goods
€12.6bn
€14bn
–
All goods
€13.2bn
€14.5bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Yes. Switzerland is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Switzerland as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Switzerland. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.76bn extra from 2022 (0.09% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.23% of a year's GDP (€2.0bn; likely €1.5bn to €2.2bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: €7.3bn (June 2026, source (search summary, to be checked against the official text)); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €9.1bn (1 June 2026, source (search summary, to be checked against the official text)).
Refugees from Ukraine
72,410 refugees from Ukraine, 8.0 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €6.5bn (0.76% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Switzerland: €6.6bn spent on refugees, less €144m, its gain on the work refugees did here. That is about €22,616 per refugee per year (286,792 refugee-years).
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €1.4bn; counted here: €1.4bn — loans at their gift value, not their full amount. Loans, full amount: €0.10bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €25m. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €4.4bn. It is not counted here.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€0.49bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Switzerland; what its firms kept of it, €0.15bn, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Switzerland's companies made less profit in Russia: €0.58bn (0.07% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €0.34bn (0.04% of one year's GDP). Russia took €1.6bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €924m to €3.7bn; 0.19% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from gold and hidden payments: €0.50bn (0.06% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.20bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). Switzerland kept more from shipping Russian oil: €23m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €19m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €17m to €74m); €60m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 27 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP.
37 sources back its parts: 14 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 9% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 85% modelled (C) and 6% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: reported national budget figures
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Switzerland's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €8.3bn, 0.97% of one year's GDP (likely 0.82% to 1.2%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Is Switzerland helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +1.0% of one year's GDP (likely 0.44% to 1.4% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.6bn (0.18% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.5bn of €1.6bn). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Switzerland trade with Russia?
It bought €2.8bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.7bn in 2021), and sold €2.5bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.6bn (0.18% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.5bn of €1.6bn).
How much Russian money is frozen in Switzerland?
Russian money frozen: 0.23% of a year's GDP (€2.0bn; likely €1.5bn to €2.2bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only. Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: €7.3bn (June 2026, source (search summary, to be checked against the official text)); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €9.1bn (1 June 2026, source (search summary, to be checked against the official text)).
How many Ukrainian refugees does Switzerland host, and what does it cost?
72,410 refugees from Ukraine, 8.0 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €6.5bn (0.76% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Switzerland: €6.6bn spent on refugees, less €144m, its gain on the work refugees did here. That is about €22,616 per refugee per year (286,792 refugee-years).
How much did Switzerland give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €1.6bn; 2023 €1.8bn; 2024 €1.7bn; 2025 €1.7bn; 2026 (to August) €1.4bn. In total since 2022: €8.3bn (likely 0.82% to 1.2%).
War Balance