Does South Korea trade with Russia, and how much has it given Ukraine?
South Korea's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.88bn (0.05% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €17.2bn (1.0% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 1.1% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.34% to 2.0% toward Ukraine; very likely · 99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 1.1% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less went beyond what sanctions required.
Chance toward Ukraine: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.05%
€877m
likely 0.04% to 0.10% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
1.0%
€17.2bn
likely 0.29% to 1.9% toward Ukraine very likely · 99%
Russia kept €17.2bn (1.0% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.95% of GDP less (€16.3bn; likely 0.26% to 1.8% toward Ukraine)
South Korea's own gain from trade with Russia: South Korea kept 0.05% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€894m; likely from 0.11% toward Russia to 0.12% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% of GDP in returns (€18m).
Its story in short
Cut beyond what sanctions required Of the €15m less that Russia kept from its trade, about 13% was required by sanctions it set itself (export controls), 87% went beyond them.
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €3.3bn (0.19% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Bought 55% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €13.3bn in 2021, €5.9bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €17.8bn of the net's €18.1bn.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.05% · €877m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.03%
€509m
Private donationsD
+0.02%
€351m
South Korea kept part of others' aid, spent hereD
−<0.01%
€56m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+<0.01%
€43m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€29m
Hosting refugeesD
+<0.01%
€1m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 1.0% · €17.2bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+1.0%
€17.8bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.19%
€3.3bn
Its firms paid Russia less taxC
+0.12%
€2.1bn
South Korea's companies made less profit in RussiaC
+0.08%
€1.4bn
South Korea earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsC
−0.02%
€416m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.02%
€281m
South Korea kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€118m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€8m
South Korea kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€7m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% in returns · €18m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyD
+<0.01%
€18m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€4.5bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.37bn in 2022 to €62m in 2025.
It bought €13.3bn from Russia in 2021 and €5.9bn in 2025 (−55%). It sold €8.5bn to Russia in 2021 and €5.2bn in 2025 (−38%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 78.4% of what it bought from Russia. For South Korea: €3.3bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
South Korea's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€2.2bn
€1.8bnrange €1.4bn to €2.2bn
€1.7bn
A
Oil products
€1.9bn
€2.2bnrange €1.7bn to €2.8bn
€6.4bn
C (estimate)
LNG
€5.3bn
€4.8bnrange €3.8bn to €6bn
€5bn
C (estimate)
Coal
€15.2bn
€13.8bnrange €10.9bn to €17.2bn
€13.7bn
C (estimate)
Other goods
€14.4bn
€13.6bn
–
All goods
€39.1bn
€36.3bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 13% required by sanctions it set itself, 87% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. South Korea has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 28 February 2022. They are export controls and financial measures, not a general sanctions regime. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists South Korea as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by South Korea. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €5.2bn extra from 2022 (0.30% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.70bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: <0.01% of a year's GDP (€18m; likely €0 to €186m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €559m; counted here: €509m — loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €92m; Loans, grant equivalent: €22m. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €2.4bn. It is not counted here.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€2.2bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in South Korea; what its firms kept of it, €56m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Its firms paid Russia less tax: €2.1bn (0.12% of one year's GDP). South Korea's companies made less profit in Russia: €1.4bn (0.08% of one year's GDP). Russia took €78m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €26m to €236m; <0.01% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.28bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). South Korea kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.12bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €273m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €257m to €1.1bn); €183m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 26 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP.
36 sources back its parts: 10 official statistics, 9 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 2% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 95% modelled (C) and 3% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
It bought €5.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€13.3bn in 2021), and sold €5.2bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €17.2bn (1.0% of GDP) less than without the war.
Does South Korea still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 78.4% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €5.9bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €13.3bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Is South Korea helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +1.1% of one year's GDP (likely 0.34% to 2.0% toward Ukraine; very likely · 99%). Chance toward Ukraine: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €17.2bn (1.0% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How much has South Korea given to Ukraine?
South Korea's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.88bn, 0.05% of one year's GDP (likely 0.04% to 0.10%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Did South Korea cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 13% required by sanctions it set itself, 87% beyond what sanctions required.
How much did South Korea give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €0.37bn; 2023 €0.20bn; 2024 €0.22bn; 2025 €62m; 2026 (to August) €26m. In total since 2022: €0.88bn (likely 0.04% to 0.10%).
Does South Korea have sanctions on Russia?
Yes. South Korea has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 28 February 2022. They are export controls and financial measures, not a general sanctions regime. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists South Korea as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by South Korea. Sources: Korea MOFA, 28 February 2022 announcement on export controls and SWIFT (search summary, to be checked against the official text); US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements.
War Balance