Moldova's support for Ukraine since 2022: €93m (0.61% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €967m (6.3% of GDP) less than without the war, largely gas Russia cut off itself (€425m of €967m). The net is 6.9% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 1.7% to 13.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · 97%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 6.9% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade. Much of what Russia kept less is gas Russia cut off itself.
Chance toward Ukraine: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.61%
€93m
likely from 0.40% below zero to 1.2% above zero likely above zero · 81%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
6.3%
€967m
likely 1.2% to 13.0% toward Ukraine very likely · 96%
Russia kept €967m (6.3% of GDP) less than without the war, largely gas Russia cut off itself (€425m of €967m).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 6.3% of GDP less (€963m; likely 1.3% to 13.0% toward Ukraine)
Moldova's own gain from trade with Russia: Moldova kept 0.03% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€4m; likely from 1.3% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Gas cut off by Russia Much of what Russia kept less is gas Russia cut off itself. Of which gas Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of transit: €425m
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €383m (2.5% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Bought 78% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €833m in 2021, €182m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Hosts many refugees 148,995 refugees from Ukraine, 62 per 1,000 residents.
Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €1.0bn of the net's €1.1bn.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.61% · €93m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.47%
€72m
Hosting refugeesC
+0.27%
€41m
Moldova kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−0.10%
€15m
Moldova kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−0.07%
€11m
Private donationsD
+0.04%
€7m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.01%
€2m
Moldova kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€1m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 6.3% · €967m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+6.6%
€1.0bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−2.5%
€383m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+2.2%
€331m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.08%
€12m
Moldova kept less from selling to RussiaC
+0.04%
€6m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−0.02%
€3m
Moldova's companies made more profit in RussiaD
−0.01%
€2m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€0.35bn. The yearly net amount changed side: 2022 −€0.17bn, 2023 +€0.33bn, 2024 +€0.35bn, 2025 +€0.29bn, 2026* +€0.27bn.
It bought €0.83bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.18bn in 2025 (−78%). It sold €0.23bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.12bn in 2025 (−48%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 38.9% of what it bought from Russia. For Moldova: €383m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 94% of it on gas contracts. Remittances from Russia changed by −2.6% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: −€399m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely −€577m to −€189m); migrants sent €318m home from Russia in that time. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Moldova's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
€67m
€60mrange €46m to €79m
€7m
A
Pipeline gas
€0.71bn
€0.66bnrange €0.50bn to €0.87bn
€4.4bn
A
Coal
€73m
€64mrange €50m to €83m
€1m
A
Other goods
€1.1bn
€1bn
–
All goods
€2bn
€1.8bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 6% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 41% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 52% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. Moldova is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Official EU reports say its alignment is incomplete. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Moldova. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.20bn extra from 2022 (1.3% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Refugees from Ukraine
148,995 refugees from Ukraine, 62 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €41m (0.27% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Moldova: €68m spent on refugees, less €27m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€1.6bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Moldova; what its firms kept of it, €28m, is taken off its support.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.33bn (2.2% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 4 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP.
34 sources back its parts: 10 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 16 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 82% modelled (C) and 18% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
It bought €0.18bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.83bn in 2021), and sold €0.12bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €967m (6.3% of GDP) less than without the war, largely gas Russia cut off itself (€425m of €967m).
How much has Moldova given to Ukraine?
Moldova's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €93m, 0.61% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.40% below zero to 1.2% above zero). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Is Moldova helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +6.9% of one year's GDP (likely 1.7% to 13.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · 97%). Chance toward Ukraine: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €967m (6.3% of GDP) less than without the war, largely gas Russia cut off itself (€425m of €967m). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Moldova–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €0.18bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.83bn in 2021), and sold €0.12bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €93m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +6.9% of one year's GDP (likely 1.7% to 13.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · 97%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Did Moldova cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 6% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 41% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 52% beyond what sanctions required.
How many Ukrainian refugees does Moldova host, and what does it cost?
148,995 refugees from Ukraine, 62 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €41m (0.27% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Moldova: €68m spent on refugees, less €27m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
War Balance