Cyprus' support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.42bn (1.3% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €540m (1.7% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €0.21bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 3.6% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 1.8% to 7.3% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 3.6% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by EU sanctions it agreed to.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
1.3%
€420m
likely 0.45% to 3.6% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
1.7%
€540m
likely 0.03% to 4.6% toward Ukraine very likely · 95%
Russia kept €540m (1.7% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 1.2% of GDP less (€377m; likely 0.13% to 3.5% toward Ukraine)
Cyprus' own gain from trade with Russia: Cyprus kept 0.50% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€163m; likely from 0.73% toward Russia to 1.8% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.64% of GDP in returns (€207m).
Its story in short
Cut through EU sanctions it agreed to Of the €303m less that Russia kept from its trade, about 67% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 33% went beyond them.
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €68m (0.21% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Hosts many refugees 26,640 refugees from Ukraine, 20 per 1,000 residents.
Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.64% of a year's GDP (€207m; likely €133m to €271m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Ships Russian oil Cyprus kept €80m (0.25% of GDP) more from shipping and insuring Russian oil.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 1.3% · €420m
Hosting refugeesD
+0.96%
€310m
Its share of EU aidB
+0.28%
€90m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.05%
€15m
Private donationsD
+0.02%
€7m
Cyprus kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−0.02%
€7m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.01%
€4m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€1m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 1.7% · €540m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesC
+0.69%
€222m
Cyprus kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.51%
€165m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.31%
€100m
Its firms paid Russia less taxD
+0.28%
€89m
Cyprus kept more from shipping Russian oilC
−0.25%
€80m
Cyprus' companies made less profit in RussiaD
+0.23%
€74m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.21%
€68m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.11%
€35m
Cyprus kept less from selling to RussiaC
+0.01%
€3m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.64% in returns · €207m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.57%
€183m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.08%
€24m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€0.33bn. Support for Ukraine rose from €52m in 2022 to €0.11bn in 2025.
It bought €81m from Russia in 2021 and €3m in 2025 (−96%). It sold €80m to Russia in 2021 and €11m in 2025 (−87%). For Cyprus: €68m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 67% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 33% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Cyprus applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Cyprus as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Cyprus. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €11m extra from 2022 (0.04% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €28m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.64% of a year's GDP (€207m; likely €133m to €271m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure; assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €1.2bn (October 2025, source).
Refugees from Ukraine
26,640 refugees from Ukraine, 20 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.31bn (0.96% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Cyprus: €332m spent on refugees, less €21m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€33m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Cyprus; what its firms kept of it, €7m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Its firms paid Russia less tax: €89m (0.28% of one year's GDP). Cyprus' companies made less profit in Russia: €74m (0.23% of one year's GDP). Russia took €11m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €1m to €84m; 0.03% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.22bn (0.69% of one year's GDP). Cyprus kept more from shipping Russian oil: €80m (0.25% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 11 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 10 of 21 members toward Ukraine.
In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP
37 sources back its parts: 12 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 6% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 49% modelled (C) and 45% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Cyprus' support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.42bn, 1.3% of one year's GDP (likely 0.45% to 3.6%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Cyprus–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €3m from Russia in 2025 (€81m in 2021), and sold €11m to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.42bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +3.6% of one year's GDP (likely 1.8% to 7.3% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Is Cyprus helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +3.6% of one year's GDP (likely 1.8% to 7.3% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €540m (1.7% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Did Cyprus cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 67% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 33% beyond what sanctions required.
How many Ukrainian refugees does Cyprus host, and what does it cost?
26,640 refugees from Ukraine, 20 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.31bn (0.96% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Cyprus: €332m spent on refugees, less €21m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
How much did Cyprus give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €52m; 2023 €87m; 2024 €0.10bn; 2025 €0.11bn; 2026 (to August) €73m. In total since 2022: €0.42bn (likely 0.45% to 3.6%).
War Balance