Does Belarus support Russia? Party to the war (with Russia)
Russia invaded Ukraine from its territory in February 2022; UN General Assembly resolution ES-11/1 deplores its involvement. Its money numbers are shown, but it is not ranked. Its money numbers since 2022 come to 3.8% of one year's GDP, leaning toward Russia (likely from 13.5% toward Russia to 7.1% toward Ukraine).
likely from 13.5% toward Russia to 7.1% toward Ukraine · €2.7bn · ≈ 0.82%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 3.8% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Party to the war (with Russia), not ranked. Russia invaded Ukraine from its territory in February 2022; UN General Assembly resolution ES-11/1 deplores its involvement. Its money numbers are shown, but it is not ranked.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.23%
€163m
likely 0.07% to 0.78% below zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
3.6%
€2.5bn
likely from 13.3% toward Russia to 7.3% toward Ukraine
Belarus moved €2.5bn (3.6% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Belarus kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.6bn of €2.5bn)).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 2.1% of GDP more (€1.4bn; likely from 10.4% toward Russia to 9.0% toward Ukraine)
Belarus' own gain from trade with Russia: Belarus kept 1.5% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1.1bn; likely 0.12% to 7.1% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Party to the war Russia invaded Ukraine from its territory in February 2022; UN General Assembly resolution ES-11/1 deplores its involvement. Its money numbers are shown, but it is not ranked.
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €1.6bn (2.3% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €3.6bn over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Sold Russia 67% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €13.6bn in 2021, €22.8bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Trade data hidden since 2022 Belarus and Russia stopped publishing trade by partner and product in 2022: its trade with Russia is estimated from partners' and Russia's own totals, so its ranges are wide.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.23% · €163m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−0.23%
€163m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 3.6% · €2.5bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+3.4%
€2.4bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−2.3%
€1.6bn
Weapons and troops sent to RussiaD
−1.8%
€1.3bn
Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD
−1.0%
€733m
Belarus earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.74%
€519m
Belarus kept more from selling to RussiaC
−0.53%
€368m
Russia kept more from services sold hereC
−0.18%
€126m
Belarus kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−0.17%
€122m
Its firms paid Russia more taxC
−0.12%
€81m
Belarus' companies made more profit in RussiaD
−0.10%
€70m
Russia kept more from weapons sold hereD
−0.02%
€15m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−<0.01%
€5m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€1.2bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €18.9bn from Russia in 2021 and €20.9bn in 2025 (+11%). It sold €13.6bn to Russia in 2021 and €22.8bn in 2025 (+67%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 31.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Belarus: €1.6bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. Depends on wages earned in Russia: remittances from Russia changed by +1.1% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: +€743m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely −€232m to +€1.7bn); migrants sent €3.4bn home from Russia in that time. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Belarus' purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€17.7bn
€16.3bnrange €13.4bn to €19.1bn
not tracked
C (estimate)
Oil products
€0.18bn
€0.16bnrange €0.13bn to €0.19bn
not tracked
C (estimate)
Pipeline gas
€10.3bn
€9.5bnrange €8.3bn to €10.6bn
not tracked
C (estimate)
Coal
€0.47bn
€0.44bnrange €0.36bn to €0.51bn
not tracked
C (estimate)
Other goods
€75.6bn
€70.3bn
–
All goods
€104bn
€96.7bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Belarus' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Belarus. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €3.6bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Refugees from Ukraine
42,021 refugees from Ukraine, 4.6 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €0.73bn (1.0% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia more tax: €81m (0.12% of one year's GDP). Belarus' companies made more profit in Russia: €70m (0.10% of one year's GDP).
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €5m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €527m to €3.2bn); €141m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
How the number is backed
29 sources back its parts: 6 official statistics, 6 research reports, 1 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 65% modelled (C) and 35% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, imf
Sold to Russia: estimated re-exports to Russia moved to the countries that made the goods
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, imf
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, imf
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Russia invaded Ukraine from its territory in February 2022; UN General Assembly resolution ES-11/1 deplores its involvement. Its money numbers are shown, but it is not ranked. In money terms the net is −3.8% of one year's GDP (likely from 13.5% toward Russia to 7.1% toward Ukraine). Belarus moved €2.5bn (3.6% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Belarus kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.6bn of €2.5bn)). Weapons and troops it sent to Russia (about €1.3bn at full value) are listed on Russia's panel; in the totals they count at the seller's gain. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Belarus trade with Russia?
It bought €20.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€18.9bn in 2021), and sold €22.8bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Belarus moved €2.5bn (3.6% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Belarus kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.6bn of €2.5bn)).
Does Belarus help Russia get around sanctions?
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €527m to €3.2bn); €141m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Does Belarus still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 31.4% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €20.9bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €18.9bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
We found no sanctions of Belarus' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Belarus.
Nearby in the ranking
Party to the war (with Russia), not ranked. Ranking
War Balance