War Balance
Andorra's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept <€1m (<0.01% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is <0.01% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.11% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Ukraine by
<0.01% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.11% toward Ukraine · <€1m · ≈ <0.01%/yr
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = <0.01% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 53%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
<0.01%
<€1m
likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.10% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept <€1m (<0.01% of GDP) less than without the war.
Chance toward Ukraine: 53%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Its firms paid Russia more tax. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.11% toward Ukraine.
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by <0.01% · <€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<0.01% |
| 2023 | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<0.01% |
| 2024 | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | +<0.01% |
| 2025 | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<0.01% |
| 2026* | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<0.01% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For Andorra: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Yes. Andorra is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Separately, Russia lists Andorra as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Andorra. Checked 27 October 2026.
Its net is essentially zero: +<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.11% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Its firms paid Russia more tax.
In money terms the net is +<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.11% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 53%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept <€1m (<0.01% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Yes. Andorra is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Separately, Russia lists Andorra as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Andorra. Sources: Andorra decree incorporating EU 19th and 20th packages, May 2026 (news report) (news report); Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned).
Essentially zero
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/andorra/