Malta's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.11bn (0.52% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €121m (0.58% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 1.2% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely <0.01% to 2.5% toward Ukraine; very likely · 95%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 1.2% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less went beyond what sanctions required.
Chance toward Ukraine: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.52%
€107m
likely 0.31% to 1.1% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.58%
€121m
likely from 0.59% toward Russia to 1.8% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 77%
Russia kept €121m (0.58% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.71% of GDP less (€147m; likely from 0.27% toward Russia to 1.9% toward Ukraine)
Malta's own gain from trade with Russia: Malta kept 0.12% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€26m; likely from 0.76% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.10% of GDP in returns (€20m).
Its story in short
Cut beyond what sanctions required Of the €130m less that Russia kept from its trade, about 12% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 88% went beyond them.
Ships Russian oil Malta kept €36m (0.17% of GDP) more from shipping and insuring Russian oil.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.52% · €107m
Hosting refugeesD
+0.26%
€53m
Its share of EU aidB
+0.23%
€48m
Private donationsD
+0.02%
€5m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.01%
€2m
Malta kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€1m
Malta kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€1m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€1m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.58% · €121m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.54%
€111m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesC
+0.20%
€42m
Malta kept more from shipping Russian oilC
−0.17%
€36m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.07%
€15m
Malta kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.05%
€10m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.05%
€9m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.10% in returns · €20m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.06%
€13m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.03%
€7m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€61m. Support for Ukraine rose from €19m in 2022 to €23m in 2025.
It bought €50m from Russia in 2021 and €3m in 2025 (−95%). It sold €9m to Russia in 2021 and €2m in 2025. For Malta: €15m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 12% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 88% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Malta applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Malta as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Malta. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €29m extra from 2022 (0.14% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.10% of a year's GDP (€20m; likely €14m to €23m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
Refugees from Ukraine
2,695 refugees from Ukraine, 4.7 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €53m (0.26% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Malta: €55m spent on refugees, less €2m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €42m (0.20% of one year's GDP). Malta kept more from shipping Russian oil: €36m (0.17% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 23 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 20 of 21 members toward Ukraine.
In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP
31 sources back its parts: 10 official statistics, 7 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 14% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 67% modelled (C) and 18% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers.
How much has Malta given to Ukraine?
Malta's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.11bn, 0.52% of one year's GDP (likely 0.31% to 1.1%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Is Malta helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +1.2% of one year's GDP (likely <0.01% to 2.5% toward Ukraine; very likely · 95%). Chance toward Ukraine: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €121m (0.58% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Did Malta cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 12% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 88% beyond what sanctions required.
How much did Malta give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €19m; 2023 €24m; 2024 €25m; 2025 €23m; 2026 (to August) €16m. In total since 2022: €0.11bn (likely 0.31% to 1.1%).
How many Ukrainian refugees does Malta host, and what does it cost?
2,695 refugees from Ukraine, 4.7 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €53m (0.26% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Malta: €55m spent on refugees, less €2m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
War Balance