War Balance
Ecuador's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €411m (0.37% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.37% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 89%).
Leaning toward Ukraine by
0.37% of a year's GDP since 2022
likely toward Ukraine · 89%
likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine · €411m · ≈ 0.08%/yr
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.37% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.37%
€411m
likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 89%
Russia kept €411m (0.37% of GDP) less than without the war.
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Ukraine: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 86% smaller, the direction would flip.
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.37% · €411m
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.43% | €483m |
| Ecuador earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.06% | €73m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.04% | €46m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +0.04% | €43m |
| Ecuador kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €4m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€0.11bn.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +<€1m | +€62m | +€63m | +0.06% |
| 2023 | +<€1m | +€114m | +€114m | +0.16% |
| 2024 | +<€1m | +€91m | +€91m | +0.24% |
| 2025 | +<€1m | +€60m | +€60m | +0.29% |
| 2026* | +<€1m | +€84m | +€84m | +0.37% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
It bought €0.41bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.16bn in 2025 (−62%). It sold €0.85bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.94bn in 2025 (+11%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 40.2% of what it bought from Russia. For Ecuador: €46m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Ecuador's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil products | €0.16bn | €0.15bnrange €0.12bn to €0.18bn | €0.14bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0m | €0m | €1m | – |
| Other goods | €0.81bn | €0.75bn | – | |
| All goods | €0.97bn | €0.90bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Ecuador's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Ecuador. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €80m extra from 2022 (0.07% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Ecuador | +0.37%+€0.41bnlikely toward Ukraine · 89% |
| Colombia | +0.15%+€0.52bnlikely toward Ukraine · 95% |
| Peru | +0.07%+€0.19bnessentially zero |
16 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 9 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 82% modelled (C) and 18% rough indications (D).
Chance toward Ukraine: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 86% smaller, the direction would flip.
In money terms the net is +0.37% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 89%). Chance toward Ukraine: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €411m (0.37% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
It bought €0.16bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.41bn in 2021), and sold €0.94bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €411m (0.37% of GDP) less than without the war.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Ecuador +0.37%, Colombia +0.15%, Peru +0.07%.
16 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Ecuador earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions: Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Ecuador's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Ecuador.
Leaning toward Ukraine
16 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
УкраїнськаDeutschFrançaisPolskiNederlandsEspañol
Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/ecuador/