Is Liberia helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine
Liberia's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €26m (0.64% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.63% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.35% toward Russia to 3.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 85%).
likely from 0.35% toward Russia to 3.4% toward Ukraine · €26m · ≈ 0.13%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.63% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.01%
<€1m
likely from 0.12% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.64%
€26m
likely from 0.33% toward Russia to 3.4% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 86%
Russia kept €26m (0.64% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.72% of GDP less (€29m; likely from 0.23% toward Russia to 3.5% toward Ukraine)
Liberia's own gain from trade with Russia: Liberia kept 0.08% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€3m; likely from 0.28% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €6m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €30m of the net's €26m.
Small economy A small economy (GDP €4.1bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 85% smaller, the direction would flip.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · <€1m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.64% · €26m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.74%
€30m
Liberia kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−0.08%
€3m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−0.02%
€1m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€5m.
It bought €11m from Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025 (−87%). It sold €3m to Russia in 2021 and €4m in 2025. For Liberia: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Liberia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Liberia. Checked 27 October 2026.
14 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 9 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 88% modelled (C) and 12% rough indications (D). No data: Russian oil bought via other countries · Sales to Russia. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 85% smaller, the direction would flip.
Is Liberia helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.63% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.35% toward Russia to 3.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 85%). Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €26m (0.64% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
We found no sanctions of Liberia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Liberia.
War Balance