Is Cuba helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine
Cuba's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €78m (0.37% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.37% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 1.2% toward Russia to 3.3% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 65%).
likely from 1.2% toward Russia to 3.3% toward Ukraine · €78m · ≈ 0.08%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.37% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 65%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
<€1m
likely from 0.01% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.37%
€78m
likely from 1.2% toward Russia to 3.3% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 65%
Russia kept €78m (0.37% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.36% of GDP less (€77m; likely from 1.2% toward Russia to 3.3% toward Ukraine)
Cuba's own gain from trade with Russia: Cuba kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€1m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to 0.05% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €96m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €86m of the net's €78m.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 65%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 91% smaller, the direction would flip.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.37% · €78m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.41%
€86m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.04%
€8m
Cuba kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€31m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €0.17bn from Russia in 2021 and €82m in 2025 (−53%). It sold €5m to Russia in 2021 and €4m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 44.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Cuba: €8m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Cuba's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€0.67bn
€0.16bnrange €40m to €0.45bn
€0.53bn
C (estimate)
Oil products
€0.58bn
€0.15bnrange €38m to €0.43bn
€0.52bn
C (estimate)
Other goods
€0.74bn
€0.20bn
–
All goods
€2bn
€0.51bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Cuba's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Cuba. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €95m extra from 2022 (0.45% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €96m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP
15 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (35%) counts
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is +0.37% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.2% toward Russia to 3.3% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 65%). Chance toward Ukraine: 65%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €78m (0.37% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Cuba trade with Russia?
It bought €82m from Russia in 2025 (€0.17bn in 2021), and sold €4m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €78m (0.37% of GDP) less than without the war.
Does Cuba still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 44.5% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €82m of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €0.17bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
What decides Cuba's number?
Chance toward Ukraine: 65%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 91% smaller, the direction would flip.
We found no sanctions of Cuba's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Cuba.
War Balance