War Balance
The Bahamas' support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €13m (0.10% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€12m of €13m). The net is 0.10% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.46% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Russia by
0.10% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.46% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine · €13m · ≈ 0.02%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.10% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: 68%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.10%
€13m
likely from 0.46% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €13m (0.10% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€12m of €13m).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Russia: 68%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.46% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.10% · €13m
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.09% | €12m |
| The Bahamas kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€11m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −<€1m | +€10m | +€10m | +0.07% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | −€8m | −€8m | +0.02% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | −€11m | −€11m | −0.06% |
| 2025 | +<€1m | −€3m | −€3m | −0.08% |
| 2026* | +<€1m | −€2m | −€2m | −0.10% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
It bought €2m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For the Bahamas: €0 paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
The Bahamas' financial regulators told banks on 12 March 2022 not to deal with people and companies sanctioned by the United States, the United Kingdom, the EU and Canada. It has no sanctions list of its own. Separately, Russia lists the Bahamas as an “unfriendly” state (government order 2018-r, 23 July 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by the Bahamas. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.29bn extra from 2022 (2.0% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €48m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
8 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 6% modelled (C) and 94% rough indications (D). No data: Sales to Russia. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why
In money terms the net is −0.10% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.46% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 68%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €13m (0.10% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€12m of €13m). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Its net is essentially zero: −0.10% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.46% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries.
8 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; The Bahamas kept more from services sold to Russia: Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
The Bahamas' financial regulators told banks on 12 March 2022 not to deal with people and companies sanctioned by the United States, the United Kingdom, the EU and Canada. It has no sanctions list of its own. Separately, Russia lists the Bahamas as an “unfriendly” state (government order 2018-r, 23 July 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by the Bahamas. Sources: Central Bank of The Bahamas, GFSR directives on Russian business activities, 12 March 2022; Government of Russia, Order of 23 July 2022 No. 2018-r amending the list (scanned).
Essentially zero
8 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/bahamas/