War Balance
Congo's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €19m (0.13% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.12% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 1.0% toward Russia to 4.1% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 54% toward Ukraine).
Toward Ukraine by
0.12% of a year's GDP since 2022
too close to call · 54% toward Ukraine
likely from 1.0% toward Russia to 4.1% toward Ukraine · €18m · ≈ 0.03%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.12% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 54%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€1m
likely from 0.07% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.13%
€19m
likely from 1.0% toward Russia to 4.1% toward Ukraine too close to call · 55% toward Ukraine
Russia kept €19m (0.13% of GDP) less than without the war.
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Ukraine: 54%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 38% smaller, the direction would flip.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €1m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.13% · €19m
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.32% | €47m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.16% | €23m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.03% | €5m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€31m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −<€1m | +€31m | +€31m | +0.21% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | +€12m | +€12m | +0.30% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | −€19m | −€20m | +0.16% |
| 2025 | −<€1m | −€10m | −€10m | +0.09% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | +€5m | +€5m | +0.12% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Congo's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | −€1m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€1m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €83m from Russia in 2021 and €86m in 2025 (+4%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For Congo: €5m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of Congo's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Congo. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €23m (0.16% of one year's GDP).
Its direction is too close to call, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Cameroon | +0.99%+€0.45bnlikely toward Ukraine · 94% |
| Angola | +0.25%+€0.26bnlikely toward Ukraine · 92% |
| Congo | +0.12%+€18mtoo close to call · 54% toward Ukraine |
| Gabon | +0.08%+€16messentially zero |
| DR Congo | −0.09%−€63messentially zero |
| Central African Republic | −4.8%−€0.12bnlikely toward Russia · 92% |
14 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 70% modelled (C) and 30% rough indications (D).
Chance toward Ukraine: 54%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 38% smaller, the direction would flip.
In money terms the net is +0.12% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.0% toward Russia to 4.1% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 54% toward Ukraine). Chance toward Ukraine: 54%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €19m (0.13% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
It bought €86m from Russia in 2025 (€83m in 2021). What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €19m (0.13% of GDP) less than without the war.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Cameroon +0.99%, Angola +0.25%, Congo +0.12%, Gabon +0.08%, DR Congo −0.09%, Central African Republic −4.8%.
14 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Congo's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Congo.
Too close to call
14 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/congo/