Is Gibraltar helping Ukraine or Russia? Too close to call
Gibraltar's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €15m (0.42% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.42% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 8.2% toward Russia to 8.7% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 56% toward Ukraine).
likely from 8.2% toward Russia to 8.7% toward Ukraine · €15m · ≈ 0.09%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.42% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.42%
€15m
likely from 8.2% toward Russia to 8.7% toward Ukraine too close to call · 56% toward Ukraine
Russia kept €15m (0.42% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.42% of GDP less (€15m; likely from 8.2% toward Russia to 8.7% toward Ukraine)
Gibraltar's own gain from trade with Russia: Gibraltar kept 0% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€0; about 0)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €6m (0.16% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €37m of the net's €15m.
Small economy A small economy (GDP €3.6bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 42% smaller, the direction would flip.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.42% · €15m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+1.0%
€37m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.44%
€16m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.16%
€6m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€8m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €18m from Russia in 2021 and €22m in 2025 (+22%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For Gibraltar: €6m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
Gibraltar is a territory of United Kingdom. We did not check whether the sanctions of United Kingdom on Russia extend to it. Separately, Russia lists Gibraltar as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Gibraltar. Checked 27 October 2026.
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €16m (0.44% of one year's GDP).
How the number is backed
12 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 73% modelled (C) and 27% rough indications (D). No data: Sales to Russia. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
Services trade with Russia: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, mirror
Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, mirror
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, imf, mirror
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, imf, mirror
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found
Chance toward Ukraine: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 42% smaller, the direction would flip.
Does Gibraltar help Russia get around sanctions?
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers.
Is Gibraltar helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.42% of one year's GDP (likely from 8.2% toward Russia to 8.7% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 56% toward Ukraine). Chance toward Ukraine: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €15m (0.42% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Gibraltar is a territory of United Kingdom. We did not check whether the sanctions of United Kingdom on Russia extend to it. Separately, Russia lists Gibraltar as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Gibraltar. Sources: Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned).
War Balance