War Balance
Is Paraguay helping Ukraine or Russia? Too close to call
Paraguay's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €50m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€31m of €50m). The net is 0.12% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.55% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 55% toward Russia).
Toward Russia by
0.12% of a year's GDP since 2022
too close to call · 55% toward Russia
likely from 0.55% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine · €50m · ≈ 0.03%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.12% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly war-time prices on gas contracts, largest in 2022).
Chance toward Russia: 55%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.12%
€50m
likely from 0.55% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine too close to call · 55% toward Russia
Russia kept €50m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€31m of €50m).
- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.15% of GDP more (€62m; likely from 0.58% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine)
- Paraguay's own gain from trade with Russia: Paraguay kept 0.03% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€13m; likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.20% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 55%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.12% · €50m
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.08% | €31m |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.07% | €30m |
| Paraguay kept less from selling to RussiaC | +0.03% | €13m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€71m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +<€1m | −€71m | −€71m | −0.18% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | +€28m | +€28m | −0.11% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | −€5m | −€5m | −0.12% |
| 2025 | −<€1m | +€7m | +€7m | −0.10% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | −€8m | −€8m | −0.12% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €0.15bn from Russia in 2021 and €84m in 2025 (−42%). It sold €0.64bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.20bn in 2025 (−69%). For Paraguay: €31m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Paraguay's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Paraguay. Checked 27 October 2026.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is too close to call, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
Neighbours by land
How the number is backed
14 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 9 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 99% modelled (C) and 1% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found
Sources, by part
Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C
Paraguay kept less from selling to Russia C
- official GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
Every source of its parts (14)
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- method input Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- method input Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened
- method input Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)
- method input Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia
- method input net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results
- method input refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins
- official GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition
- method input Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports
- method input Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)
- method input Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums
- own estimate Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it
Questions
Is Paraguay helping Russia?
In money terms the net is −0.12% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.55% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 55% toward Russia). Chance toward Russia: 55%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €50m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€31m of €50m). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Paraguay trade with Russia?
It bought €84m from Russia in 2025 (€0.15bn in 2021), and sold €0.20bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €50m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€31m of €50m).
How does Paraguay compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Bolivia +0.44%, Argentina +0.05%, Paraguay −0.12%, Brazil −0.51%.
Where do the numbers for Paraguay come from?
14 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE); Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Paraguay kept less from selling to Russia: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
Does Paraguay have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of Paraguay's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Paraguay.
Nearby in the ranking
Too close to call
- Slovakia+0.24%Too close to call · +€294m · 58%
- Congo+0.12%Too close to call · +€18m · 54%
- Anguilla−0.12%Too close to call · −€1m · 59%
- Paraguay−0.12%Too close to call · −€50m · 55%
- Morocco−0.13%Too close to call · −€182m · 59%
- Cabo Verde−0.17%Too close to call · −€4m · 56%
- Sudan−0.21%Too close to call · −€94m · 54%
More about Paraguay
Its parts, ranked against other countries
Every country, by year
14 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/paraguay/