War Balance
Anguilla's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Anguilla moved €1m (0.12% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Anguilla kept more from selling to Russia, mostly more tax paid in Russia by companies (<€1m of €1m)). The net is 0.12% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 2.1% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 59% toward Russia).
Toward Russia by
0.12% of a year's GDP since 2022
too close to call · 59% toward Russia
likely from 2.1% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine · €1m · ≈ 0.03%/yr
Raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.12% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Chance toward Russia: 59%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
No support for Ukraine recorded:
0%
€0
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.12%
€1m
likely from 2.1% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine too close to call · 59% toward Russia
Anguilla moved €1m (0.12% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Anguilla kept more from selling to Russia, mostly more tax paid in Russia by companies (<€1m of €1m)).
Chance toward Russia: 59%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Its firms paid Russia more tax.
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.12% · €1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | €0 | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.03% |
| 2023 | €0 | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.05% |
| 2024 | €0 | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.07% |
| 2025 | €0 | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.09% |
| 2026* | €0 | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.12% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Anguilla is a British overseas territory: the UK's sanctions on Russia apply there through the Russia (Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order 2020. Separately, Russia lists Anguilla as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Anguilla. Checked 27 October 2026.
In money terms the net is −0.12% of one year's GDP (likely from 2.1% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 59% toward Russia). Chance toward Russia: 59%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Anguilla moved €1m (0.12% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Anguilla kept more from selling to Russia, mostly more tax paid in Russia by companies (<€1m of €1m)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Anguilla is a British overseas territory: the UK's sanctions on Russia apply there through the Russia (Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order 2020. Separately, Russia lists Anguilla as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Anguilla. Sources: The Russia (Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order 2020 (SI 2020/1571), Schedule 1; Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned).
Too close to call
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/anguilla/