Is Burkina Faso helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia
Burkina Faso's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €749m (3.9% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 3.9% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 7.1% toward Russia to 0.80% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 92%).
likely from 7.1% toward Russia to 0.80% toward Ukraine · €749m · ≈ 0.83%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 3.9% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more fuel bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 92%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
<€1m
likely from 0.05% below zero to 0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
3.9%
€749m
likely from 7.1% toward Russia to 0.80% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 92%
Russia kept €749m (3.9% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 3.9% of GDP more (€749m; likely from 7.1% toward Russia to 0.80% toward Ukraine)
Burkina Faso's own gain from trade with Russia: Burkina Faso kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €208m (1.1% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €89m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Russian forces in the country Wagner Group or Russia's Africa Corps operated here: 2024, 2025, 2026. Paid to them and taken by their firms, at Russia's gain, against 2021: €6m.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €533m of the net's €749m.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 92%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 3.9% · €749m
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−2.8%
€533m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−1.1%
€208m
Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps)D
−0.03%
€6m
Russia kept more from weapons sold hereD
−0.02%
€4m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.01%
€3m
Russia kept more from services sold hereC
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€0.26bn.
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €0.18bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.62bn in 2025 (+250%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €4m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 77.8% of what it bought from Russia. For Burkina Faso: €208m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Burkina Faso's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
€2.2bn
€1.9bnrange €1.1bn to €3.1bn
not tracked
C (estimate)
Other goods
€0.59bn
€0.53bn
–
All goods
€2.8bn
€2.4bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Burkina Faso's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Burkina Faso. Checked 27 October 2026.
16 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 98% modelled (C) and 2% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (95%) counts
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found
In money terms the net is −3.9% of one year's GDP (likely from 7.1% toward Russia to 0.80% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 92%). Chance toward Russia: 92%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €749m (3.9% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Burkina Faso trade with Russia?
It bought €0.62bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.18bn in 2021), and sold €4m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €749m (3.9% of GDP) more than without the war.
How does Burkina Faso compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Mali +0.06%, Niger −<0.01%, Benin −0.36%, Togo −0.48%, Côte d'Ivoire −0.71%, Ghana −0.92%, Burkina Faso −3.9%.
We found no sanctions of Burkina Faso's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Burkina Faso.
War Balance