War Balance
Senegal's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€2m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €598m (2.1% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 2.1% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 4.0% toward Russia to 2.9% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 76%).
Leaning toward Russia by
2.1% of a year's GDP since 2022
likely toward Russia · 76%
likely from 4.0% toward Russia to 2.9% toward Ukraine · €600m · ≈ 0.46%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 2.1% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more fuel bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 76%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€2m
likely from 0.07% below zero to 0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
2.1%
€598m
likely from 4.0% toward Russia to 2.9% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 76%
Russia kept €598m (2.1% of GDP) more than without the war.
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Russia: 76%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €2m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €2m |
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 2.1% · €598m
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −1.8% | €506m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.96% | €270m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +0.63% | €178m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€0.18bn.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −<€1m | −€90m | −€91m | −0.32% |
| 2023 | −€1m | −€125m | −€125m | −0.77% |
| 2024 | −€1m | −€175m | −€176m | −1.4% |
| 2025 | +<€1m | −€105m | −€104m | −1.8% |
| 2026* | +<€1m | −€103m | −€103m | −2.1% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Senegal's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | −€2m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€2m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €0.44bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.69bn in 2025 (+57%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €0m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 55.2% of what it bought from Russia. For Senegal: €270m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Senegal's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil products | €3.2bn | €2.5bnrange €1.8bn to €3.4bn | €4.2bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0.17bn | €0.13bnrange €96m to €0.18bn | €0.27bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €0.63bn | €0.56bn | – | |
| All goods | €4bn | €3.2bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Senegal's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Senegal. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.29bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.18bn (0.63% of one year's GDP).
Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Mali | +0.06%+€14messentially zero |
| Mauritania | −0.12%−€12mlikely toward Russia · 68% |
| Gambia | −1.5%−€33mlikely toward Russia · 88% |
| Senegal | −2.1%−€0.60bnlikely toward Russia · 76% |
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Mozambique | −0.85%−€0.16bnlikely toward Russia · 68% |
| Namibia | −0.83%−€0.10bnlikely toward Russia · 77% |
| United Arab Emirates | −0.71%−€3.5bnlikely toward Russia · 97% |
| Egypt | −0.43%−€1.7bnlikely toward Russia · 95% |
16 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 81% modelled (C) and 19% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −2.1% of one year's GDP (likely from 4.0% toward Russia to 2.9% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 76%). Chance toward Russia: 76%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €598m (2.1% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
It bought €0.69bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.44bn in 2021). What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €598m (2.1% of GDP) more than without the war.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Mali +0.06%, Mauritania −0.12%, Gambia −1.5%, Senegal −2.1%.
16 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE); Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Senegal's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Senegal.
Leaning toward Russia
16 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/senegal/