War Balance
Its story in short
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
Is Guatemala helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero
Guatemala's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €18m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.02% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Ukraine by
0.02% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine · €18m · ≈ <0.01%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.02% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 71%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.02%
€18m
likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €18m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war.
- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.02% of GDP less (€17m; likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine)
- Guatemala's own gain from trade with Russia: Guatemala kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€1m; likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 71%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.02% · €18m
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.02% | €22m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €3m |
| Guatemala kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€9m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€1m | +€6m | +€7m | +<0.01% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | +€9m | +€9m | +0.02% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | +€3m | +€3m | +0.02% |
| 2025 | −<€1m | +€1m | +<€1m | +0.02% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | +0.02% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Support for Ukraine by type
Guatemala's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | −€1m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€1m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €0.21bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.16bn in 2025 (−22%). It sold €40m to Russia in 2021 and €4m in 2025 (−89%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 1.9% of what it bought from Russia. For Guatemala: €1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Guatemala's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Guatemala. Checked 27 October 2026.
The cost of switching away from Russian energy
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €10m extra from 2022 (0.01% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
Neighbours by land
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Honduras | +0.24%+€76mlikely toward Ukraine · 74% |
| El Salvador | +0.04%+€11messentially zero |
| Mexico | +0.03%+€0.41bnessentially zero |
| Guatemala | +0.02%+€18messentially zero |
| Belize | −0.13%−€4mnear zero · 82% toward Russia |
How the number is backed
16 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 10 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 88% modelled (C) and 12% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Sources, by part
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
Guatemala kept less from selling to Russia C
- official GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition
Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
Russia kept more from services sold here C
Every source of its parts (16)
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- method input Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened
- method input Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)
- method input Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia
- method input Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat
- method input net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results
- method input refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins
- own estimate Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it
- official GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition
- method input Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports
- method input Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)
- method input Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums
- method input money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
- official Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia
Questions
Why is Guatemala's net so small?
Its net is essentially zero: +0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
Is Guatemala helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 71%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €18m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How does Guatemala compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Honduras +0.24%, El Salvador +0.04%, Mexico +0.03%, Guatemala +0.02%, Belize −0.13%.
Does Guatemala trade with Russia?
It bought €0.16bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.21bn in 2021), and sold €4m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €18m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war.
Where do the numbers for Guatemala come from?
16 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Guatemala kept less from selling to Russia: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
Does Guatemala have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of Guatemala's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Guatemala.
Nearby in the ranking
Essentially zero
- El Salvador+0.04%Essentially zero · +€11m · 58%
- Mexico+0.03%Essentially zero · +€405m · 88%
- Kazakhstan+0.02%Essentially zero · +€55m · 60%
- Guatemala+0.02%Essentially zero · +€18m · 71%
- Algeria+0.02%Essentially zero · +€36m · 57%
- Eswatini+0.01%Essentially zero · +€1m · 66%
- Madagascar+0.01%Essentially zero · +€2m · 59%
More about Guatemala
Every country, by year
16 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/guatemala/