Is El Salvador helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Q: Why is El Salvador's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.04% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.26% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

Q: Is El Salvador helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.04% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.26% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 58%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €11m (0.04% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

Q: How does El Salvador compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Honduras +0.24%, El Salvador +0.04%, Guatemala +0.02%.

Q: Where do the numbers for El Salvador come from?

10 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

Q: Does El Salvador have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of El Salvador's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name El Salvador.

El Salvador's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €11m (0.04% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.04% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.26% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

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Toward Ukraine by

0.04% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.26% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine · €11m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.04% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 58%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave, by

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.04%

€11m

likely from 0.26% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €11m (0.04% of GDP) less than without the war.

Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.04% of GDP less (€12m; likely from 0.26% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine)
El Salvador's own gain from trade with Russia: El Salvador kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Its story in short

Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 58%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.26% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine.

What makes up the number

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave, by <0.01% · <€1m

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.04% · €11m

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC	+0.08%	€24m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC	−0.04%	€13m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€22m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

Year	Support for Ukraine	Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)	Net	Net since 2022
2022	−<€1m	−€22m	−€22m	−0.07%
2023	−<€1m	+€3m	+€3m	−0.06%
2024	+<€1m	+€8m	+€9m	−0.04%
2025	+<€1m	+€11m	+€11m	+<0.01%
2026*	−<€1m	+€11m	+€11m	+0.04%

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €80m from Russia in 2021 and €17m in 2025 (−79%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For El Salvador: €13m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of El Salvador's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name El Salvador. Checked 27 October 2026.

Every country's sanctions on Russia →

Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

Neighbours by land

Country	Net, % of GDP
Honduras	+0.24%+€76mlikely toward Ukraine · 74%
El Salvador	+0.04%+€11messentially zero
Guatemala	+0.02%+€18messentially zero

How the number is backed

10 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).

Data coverage

Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

Sources, by part

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

Every source of its parts (10)

Questions

Why is El Salvador's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.04% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.26% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.