War Balance
The Philippines' support for Ukraine since 2022: −€11m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €186m (0.05% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.04% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.06% toward Russia to 0.27% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Ukraine by
0.04% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.06% toward Russia to 0.27% toward Ukraine · €175m · ≈ <0.01%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.04% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 75%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€11m
likely from 0.01% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.05%
€186m
likely from 0.06% toward Russia to 0.27% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €186m (0.05% of GDP) less than without the war.
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Ukraine: 75%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.06% toward Russia to 0.27% toward Ukraine.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €11m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €17m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €5m |
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.05% · €186m
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.05% | €188m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesC | +<0.01% | €37m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €35m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €3m |
| The Philippines kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €3m |
| The Philippines kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €3m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2025: +€84m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −€4m | +€78m | +€74m | +0.02% |
| 2023 | −€1m | −€12m | −€12m | +0.02% |
| 2024 | −€1m | −€18m | −€18m | +0.01% |
| 2025 | −€4m | +€89m | +€84m | +0.03% |
| 2026* | −€2m | +€50m | +€48m | +0.04% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
The Philippines' support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €5mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €5m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€17m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€11m |
Quality of the split: A No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €0.58bn from Russia in 2021 and €30m in 2025 (−95%). It sold €0.10bn to Russia in 2021 and €52m in 2025 (−49%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 15.3% of what it bought from Russia. For the Philippines: €35m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
The Philippines' purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crude oil | €0.19bn | €92mrange €75m to €0.11bn | €0.16bn | C (estimate) |
| Oil products | €0.13bn | €0.12bnrange €97m to €0.13bn | €0.14bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0.13bn | €85mrange €68m to €0.10bn | €0.17bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €0.92bn | €0.67bn | – | |
| All goods | €1.4bn | €0.96bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: B, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of the Philippines' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Philippines. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €64m extra from 2022 (0.02% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €42m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
22 sources back its parts: 5 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).
Its net is essentially zero: +0.04% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.06% toward Russia to 0.27% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries.
In money terms the net is +0.04% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.06% toward Russia to 0.27% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 75%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €186m (0.05% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
22 sources back its parts, 5 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of the Philippines' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Philippines.
Essentially zero
22 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/philippines/