Is Eswatini helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Q: Why is Eswatini's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.20% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

Q: Is Eswatini helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.20% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 66%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

Q: Where do the numbers for Eswatini come from?

8 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

Q: Does Eswatini have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Eswatini's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Eswatini.

Eswatini's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.01% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.20% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

Open in the map →

Toward Ukraine by

0.01% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.20% toward Ukraine · €1m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.01% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 66%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.01%

€1m

likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.20% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €1m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war.

Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.01% of GDP less (€1m; likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.20% toward Ukraine)
Eswatini's own gain from trade with Russia: Eswatini kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Its story in short

Small economy A small economy (GDP €4.4bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 66%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.20% toward Ukraine.

What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.01% · €1m

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC

+0.03%

€1m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

By year

The one year with a net amount of note was 2022: +€1m.

Year	Support for Ukraine	Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)	Net	Net since 2022
2022	−<€1m	+€1m	+€1m	+0.01%
2023	−<€1m	−<€1m	−<€1m	+0.01%
2024	−<€1m	+<€1m	−<€1m	+0.01%
2025	−<€1m	+<€1m	−<€1m	+0.01%
2026*	−<€1m	+<€1m	+<€1m	+0.01%

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

Trade with Russia before and after

It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025. It sold €2m to Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025. For Eswatini: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Eswatini's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Eswatini. Checked 27 October 2026.

Every country's sanctions on Russia →

How the number is backed

8 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).

Data coverage

Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: imf, mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

Sources, by part

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

Every source of its parts (8)

Questions

Why is Eswatini's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.20% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

Is Eswatini helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.20% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 66%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

Where do the numbers for Eswatini come from?

8 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

Does Eswatini have sanctions on Russia?

Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

Kazakhstan+0.02%Essentially zero · +€55m · 60%
Guatemala+0.02%Essentially zero · +€18m · 71%
Algeria+0.02%Essentially zero · +€36m · 57%
Eswatini+0.01%Essentially zero · +€1m · 66%
Madagascar+0.01%Essentially zero · +€2m · 59%
Lesotho+0.01%Essentially zero · +<€1m · 80%
Grenada+<0.01%Essentially zero · +<€1m · 68%

More about Eswatini

Every country, by year

8 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured

Українська Deutsch Français Polski Nederlands Español

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/eswatini/