War Balance
Mexico's support for Ukraine since 2022: €18m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €387m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.03% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Ukraine by
0.03% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine · €405m · ≈ <0.01%/yr
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.03% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
€18m
likely from <0.01% below zero to 0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.02%
€387m
likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €387m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war.
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Ukraine: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine.
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €18m
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €27m |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €9m |
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.02% · €387m
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.02% | €340m |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxD | +<0.01% | €19m |
| Mexico kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €11m |
| Mexico's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +<0.01% | €10m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +<0.01% | €6m |
| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +<0.01% | €4m |
| Mexico kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €2m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€0.12bn.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€2m | +€122m | +€125m | +<0.01% |
| 2023 | +€7m | +€10m | +€18m | +<0.01% |
| 2024 | +€8m | +€66m | +€74m | +0.01% |
| 2025 | −€1m | +€100m | +€99m | +0.02% |
| 2026* | +€3m | +€88m | +€90m | +0.03% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Mexico's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €27mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €27m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€9m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €18m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €1.7bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.78bn in 2025 (−55%). It sold €0.42bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.27bn in 2025 (−35%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 1.8% of what it bought from Russia. For Mexico: €4m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2026. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of Mexico's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Mexico. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €21m extra from 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Russia took €112m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €28m to €366m; <0.01% of a year's GDP.
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| United States | +0.51%+€132bnvery likely · >99% |
| Mexico | +0.03%+€0.41bnessentially zero |
| Guatemala | +0.02%+€18messentially zero |
| Belize | −0.13%−€4mnear zero · 82% toward Russia |
24 sources back its parts: 5 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 92% modelled (C) and 8% rough indications (D).
In money terms: it bought €0.78bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.7bn in 2021), and sold €0.27bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €18m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +0.03% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
In money terms the net is +0.03% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €387m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Almost nothing that can be measured: €18m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).
It bought €0.78bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.7bn in 2021), and sold €0.27bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €387m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war.
Its net is essentially zero: +0.03% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: United States +0.51%, Mexico +0.03%, Guatemala +0.02%, Belize −0.13%.
We found no sanctions of Mexico's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Mexico.
Essentially zero
24 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/mexico/