Does Brazil support Russia? What the money flows show
Brazil's support for Ukraine since 2022: €30m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €10.1bn (0.51% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.51% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.29% to 0.71% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
likely 0.29% to 0.71% toward Russia · €10.1bn · ≈ 0.11%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.51% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
€30m
likely <0.01% to 0.01% essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.51%
€10.1bn
likely 0.29% to 0.71% toward Russia very likely · >99%
Russia kept €10.1bn (0.51% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.51% of GDP more (€10.0bn; likely 0.28% to 0.70% toward Russia)
Brazil's own gain from trade with Russia: Brazil kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€138m; likely <0.01% to 0.03% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €2.1bn (0.10% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Bought 69% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €4.8bn in 2021, €8.0bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €7.6bn of the net's €10.1bn.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €30m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€32m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€2m
Hosting refugeesD
+<0.01%
€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.51% · €10.1bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−0.39%
€7.6bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.10%
€2.1bn
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.01%
€292m
Brazil earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−<0.01%
€121m
Russia kept more from services sold hereC
−<0.01%
€37m
Brazil kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€22m
Brazil kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€6m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€3.1bn.
It bought €4.8bn from Russia in 2021 and €8bn in 2025 (+69%). It sold €1.3bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.4bn in 2025 (+3%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 15.6% of what it bought from Russia. For Brazil: €2.1bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Brazil's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€0.51bn
€0.35bnrange €0.29bn to €0.43bn
€90m
A
Oil products
€21.9bn
€18.7bnrange €15.8bn to €21.8bn
€23bn
A
LNG
€35m
€32mrange €26m to €38m
€35m
A
Coal
€1.1bn
€1bnrange €0.85bn to €1.2bn
€0.68bn
A
Other goods
€22.6bn
€20.2bn
–
All goods
€46.1bn
€40.3bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
No. Brazil has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (April 2023). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Brazil. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.35bn extra from 2022 (0.02% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.72bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Refugees from Ukraine
1,669 refugees from Ukraine, 0.0 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Brazil: €1m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 20 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. BRICS: number 3 of 6 members toward Russia.
27 sources back its parts: 8 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 96% modelled (C) and 4% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −0.51% of one year's GDP (likely 0.29% to 0.71% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €10.1bn (0.51% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Brazil trade with Russia?
It bought €8bn from Russia in 2025 (€4.8bn in 2021), and sold €1.4bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €10.1bn (0.51% of GDP) more than without the war.
Brazil–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €8bn from Russia in 2025 (€4.8bn in 2021), and sold €1.4bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €30m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −0.51% of one year's GDP (likely 0.29% to 0.71% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
How much has Brazil given to Ukraine?
Almost nothing that can be measured: €30m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).
How does Brazil compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Bolivia +0.44%, Suriname +0.21%, Colombia +0.15%, Peru +0.07%, Argentina +0.05%, Guyana −<0.01%, Uruguay −0.07%, Venezuela −0.11%, Paraguay −0.12%, Brazil −0.51%. In the map's ranking: number 20 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
No. Brazil has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (April 2023). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Brazil. Sources: Reuters, April 2023: Brazil has not joined sanctions (news report) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).
War Balance