War Balance
South Africa's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€3m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.8bn (0.49% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€1.7bn of €1.8bn). The net is 0.49% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.18% to 0.79% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
Toward Russia by
0.49% of a year's GDP since 2022
very likely · >99%
likely 0.18% to 0.79% toward Russia · €1.8bn · ≈ 0.10%/yr
Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.49% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave, by
<0.01%
€3m
likely from 0.01% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.49%
€1.8bn
likely 0.18% to 0.79% toward Russia very likely · >99%
Russia kept €1.8bn (0.49% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€1.7bn of €1.8bn).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave, by <0.01% · €3m
| South Africa kept part of others' aid, spent hereC | −<0.01% | €10m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €9m |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €2m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.49% · €1.8bn
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesC | −0.47% | €1.7bn |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.03% | €93m |
| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +0.01% | €55m |
| South Africa earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −<0.01% | €27m |
| South Africa's companies made less profit in RussiaC | +<0.01% | €26m |
| South Africa kept more from selling to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €19m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxC | −<0.01% | €3m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| South Africa kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.57bn.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€2m | −€571m | −€569m | −0.15% |
| 2023 | +€2m | −€491m | −€489m | −0.29% |
| 2024 | −€1m | −€412m | −€412m | −0.40% |
| 2025 | −€5m | −€155m | −€160m | −0.44% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | −€177m | −€177m | −0.49% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
South Africa's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €9mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €9m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€2m |
| Money flowing back | −€10msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€3m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €0.49bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.46bn in 2025 (−6%). It sold €0.35bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.78bn in 2025 (+124%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 11.5% of what it bought from Russia. For South Africa: €55m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2023. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
South Africa's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil products | €0.13bn | €0.40bnrange €0.24bn to €0.62bn | €0.19bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0.18bn | €0.17bnrange €0.11bn to €0.25bn | €59m | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €2bn | €1.9bn | – | |
| All goods | €2.4bn | €2.5bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of South Africa's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name South Africa. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €16m. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
€0.32bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in South Africa; what its firms kept of it, €10m, is taken off its support.
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €1.7bn (0.47% of one year's GDP). More fuel bought from refiners abroad, some of it made from Russian crude, because its own refineries closed (New Zealand's Marsden Point in 2022; South Africa's Engen and SAPREF in 2020 and 2022). A structural change in supply, not a policy.
In the map's ranking: number 21 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. BRICS: number 4 of 6 members toward Russia.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Eswatini | +0.01%+€1messentially zero |
| Lesotho | +0.01%+<€1messentially zero |
| Zimbabwe | −0.05%−€17messentially zero |
| Botswana | −0.07%−€12messentially zero |
| South Africa | −0.49%−€1.8bnvery likely · >99% |
| Namibia | −0.83%−€0.10bnlikely toward Russia · 77% |
| Mozambique | −0.85%−€0.16bnlikely toward Russia · 68% |
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Iran | −0.44%−€1.9bnvery likely · >99% |
| Jordan | −0.35%−€0.18bnvery likely · 97% |
| Saudi Arabia | −0.30%−€3.5bnvery likely · 99% |
| Côte d'Ivoire | −0.71%−€0.52bnvery likely · >99% |
28 sources back its parts: 9 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 99% modelled (C) and 1% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −0.49% of one year's GDP (likely 0.18% to 0.79% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.8bn (0.49% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€1.7bn of €1.8bn). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
In money terms: it bought €0.46bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.49bn in 2021), and sold €0.78bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €3m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −0.49% of one year's GDP (likely 0.18% to 0.79% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
It bought €0.46bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.49bn in 2021), and sold €0.78bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.8bn (0.49% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€1.7bn of €1.8bn).
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Eswatini +0.01%, Lesotho +0.01%, Zimbabwe −0.05%, Botswana −0.07%, South Africa −0.49%, Namibia −0.83%, Mozambique −0.85%. In the map's ranking: number 21 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
28 sources back its parts, 9 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics; Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of South Africa's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name South Africa.
Toward Russia · number 21 of 32
28 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/south-africa/