Is the Comoros helping Russia? What the money flows show
The Comoros' support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). The Comoros moved €7m (0.48% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Comoros kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€4m of €7m)). The net is 0.48% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.27% to 0.96% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
likely 0.27% to 0.96% toward Russia · €7m · ≈ 0.10%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.48% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.48%
€7m
likely 0.27% to 0.96% toward Russia very likely · >99%
The Comoros moved €7m (0.48% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Comoros kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€4m of €7m)).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.31% of GDP more (€4m; likely 0.15% to 0.54% toward Russia)
The Comoros' own gain from trade with Russia: The Comoros kept 0.17% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€2m; likely 0.04% to 0.59% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
Ships Russian oil The Comoros kept €2m (0.17% of GDP) more from shipping and insuring Russian oil.
Rough data: mostly estimates 99% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
Small economy A small economy (GDP €1.4bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.48% · €7m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.31%
€4m
The Comoros kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−0.17%
€2m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€2m.
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For the Comoros: €0 paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of the Comoros' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Comoros. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €4m (0.31% of one year's GDP). The Comoros kept more from shipping Russian oil: €2m (0.17% of one year's GDP).
How the number is backed
7 sources back its parts: 0 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 5 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 0% modelled (C) and 100% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found
Sources, by part
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
In money terms the net is −0.48% of one year's GDP (likely 0.27% to 0.96% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. The Comoros moved €7m (0.48% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Comoros kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€4m of €7m)). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
We found no sanctions of the Comoros' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Comoros.
War Balance