Is Jamaica helping Russia? What the money flows show
Jamaica's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €94m (0.49% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.49% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.30% to 0.79% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
likely 0.30% to 0.79% toward Russia · €94m · ≈ 0.10%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.49% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more fuel bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.49%
€94m
likely 0.30% to 0.79% toward Russia very likely · >99%
Russia kept €94m (0.49% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.45% of GDP more (€87m; likely 0.29% to 0.72% toward Russia)
Jamaica's own gain from trade with Russia: Jamaica kept 0.04% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€7m; likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.04% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €24m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €69m of the net's €94m.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.49% · €94m
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−0.36%
€69m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.09%
€18m
Jamaica kept more from selling to RussiaC
−0.03%
€6m
Jamaica kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€1m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+<0.01%
€1m
Russia kept more from services sold hereC
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€37m.
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €2m from Russia in 2021 and €36m in 2025. It sold €37m to Russia in 2021 and €0.16bn in 2025 (+338%). For Jamaica: €18m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Jamaica's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
€0.61bn
€0.23bnrange €0.17bn to €0.29bn
€0.56bn
C (estimate)
Other goods
€0m
€0m
–
All goods
€0.61bn
€0.23bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Jamaica's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Jamaica. Checked 27 October 2026.
19 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 10 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 99% modelled (C) and 1% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found
In money terms the net is −0.49% of one year's GDP (likely 0.30% to 0.79% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €94m (0.49% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
We found no sanctions of Jamaica's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Jamaica.
War Balance