War Balance

Is Barbados helping Russia? What the money flows show

Barbados' support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Barbados moved €6m (0.09% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Barbados kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€6m of €6m)). The net is 0.09% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.05% to 0.17% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).

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Toward Russia by

0.09% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 0.05% to 0.17% toward Russia · €6m · ≈ 0.02%/yr

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.09% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.

Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave, by

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.09%

€6m

likely 0.05% to 0.17% toward Russia very likely · >99%

Barbados moved €6m (0.09% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Barbados kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€6m of €6m)).

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Its story in short

What makes up the number

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave, by <0.01% · <€1m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.09% · €6m

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate−0.09%€6m
Barbados kept more from shipping Russian oilD−0.02%€1m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC+<0.01%€1m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€2m.

YearSupport for UkraineTrade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)NetNet since 2022
2022+<€1m−<€1m−<€1m−<0.01%
2023−<€1m−€1m−€1m−0.02%
2024−<€1m−€2m−€2m−0.05%
2025+<€1m−€2m−€2m−0.07%
2026*+<€1m−€1m−€1m−0.09%

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

Trade with Russia before and after

It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and €0m in 2025. For Barbados: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Barbados' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Barbados. Checked 27 October 2026.

Every country's sanctions on Russia →

The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €17m. This is not in the totals: shown for information.

Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 31 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

CountryNet, % of GDP
Jamaica−0.49%−€94mvery likely · >99%
Brazil−0.51%−€10.1bnvery likely · >99%

How the number is backed

13 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 9 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 7% modelled (C) and 93% rough indications (D).

Data coverage

Sources, by part

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

Barbados kept more from shipping Russian oil D

Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

Every source of its parts (13)

Questions

Is Barbados helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.09% of one year's GDP (likely 0.05% to 0.17% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Barbados moved €6m (0.09% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Barbados kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€6m of €6m)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

Where do the numbers for Barbados come from?

13 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Barbados kept more from shipping Russian oil: Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

Does Barbados have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Barbados' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Barbados.

Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 31 of 32

  1. Central African Republic−4.8%Leaning toward Russia · −€115m · 92%
  2. Mongolia−6.4%Leaning toward Russia · −€1.2bn · 77%
  3. 32.Papua New Guinea−0.08%Toward Russia · −€22m
  4. 31.Barbados−0.09%Toward Russia · −€6m
  5. Kiribati−0.12%Toward Russia · −<€1m
  6. 30.Sierra Leone−0.14%Toward Russia · −€9m
  7. Nauru−0.19%Toward Russia · −<€1m

More about Barbados

Every country, by year

13 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/barbados/