War Balance
Colombia's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€2m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €526m (0.15% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.15% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.54% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 95%).
Leaning toward Ukraine by
0.15% of a year's GDP since 2022
likely toward Ukraine · 95%
likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.54% toward Ukraine · €524m · ≈ 0.03%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.15% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€2m
likely from <0.01% below zero to 0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.15%
€526m
likely <0.01% to 0.54% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 94%
Russia kept €526m (0.15% of GDP) less than without the war.
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Ukraine: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 89% smaller, the direction would flip.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €2m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €7m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €5m |
| Colombia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €1m |
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.15% · €526m
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.17% | €594m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.02% | €65m |
| Colombia kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Colombia kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €2m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€0.13bn.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −<€1m | +€122m | +€122m | +0.03% |
| 2023 | +€1m | +€128m | +€129m | +0.07% |
| 2024 | +€1m | +€111m | +€112m | +0.10% |
| 2025 | −€3m | +€56m | +€54m | +0.12% |
| 2026* | −€1m | +€109m | +€108m | +0.15% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Colombia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €5mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €5m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€7m |
| Money flowing back | −€1msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€2m |
Quality of the split: A No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €0.42bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.26bn in 2025 (−39%). It sold €0.12bn to Russia in 2021 and €56m in 2025 (−53%). For Colombia: €65m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of Colombia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Colombia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Ecuador | +0.37%+€0.41bnlikely toward Ukraine · 89% |
| Colombia | +0.15%+€0.52bnlikely toward Ukraine · 95% |
| Panama | +0.08%+€63messentially zero |
| Peru | +0.07%+€0.19bnessentially zero |
| Venezuela | −0.11%−€0.11bnnear zero · 71% toward Russia |
| Brazil | −0.51%−€10.1bnvery likely · >99% |
20 sources back its parts: 4 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 11 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is +0.15% of one year's GDP (likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.54% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 95%). Chance toward Ukraine: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €526m (0.15% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Chance toward Ukraine: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 89% smaller, the direction would flip.
It bought €0.26bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.42bn in 2021), and sold €56m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €526m (0.15% of GDP) less than without the war.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Ecuador +0.37%, Colombia +0.15%, Panama +0.08%, Peru +0.07%, Venezuela −0.11%, Brazil −0.51%.
20 sources back its parts, 4 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE); Ukraine kept less from sales here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Colombia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Colombia.
Leaning toward Ukraine
20 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/colombia/