Its story in short
- Rough data: mostly estimates 68% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
Uruguay's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €51m (0.07% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€39m of €51m). The net is 0.07% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Russia by
0.07% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine · €50m · ≈ 0.01%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.07% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: 63%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
<€1m
about 0 essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.07%
€51m
likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €51m (0.07% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€39m of €51m).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Russia: 63%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine.
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.07% · €51m
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.05% | €39m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.02% | €15m |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Uruguay kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€32m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −<€1m | −€31m | −€32m | −0.04% |
| 2023 | +<€1m | −€12m | −€12m | −0.06% |
| 2024 | +<€1m | −€11m | −€11m | −0.08% |
| 2025 | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.08% |
| 2026* | +<€1m | +€5m | +€5m | −0.07% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
It bought €79m from Russia in 2021 and €55m in 2025 (−30%). It sold €97m to Russia in 2021 and €61m in 2025 (−37%). For Uruguay: €15m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of Uruguay's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Uruguay. Checked 27 October 2026.
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
16 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 9 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 32% modelled (C) and 68% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −0.07% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 63%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €51m (0.07% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€39m of €51m). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Its net is essentially zero: −0.07% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Argentina +0.05%, Uruguay −0.07%, Brazil −0.51%.
It bought €55m from Russia in 2025 (€79m in 2021), and sold €61m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €51m (0.07% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€39m of €51m).
16 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Uruguay's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Uruguay.
Essentially zero
16 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/uruguay/