Its story in short
- Bought 632% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €116m in 2021, €851m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Venezuela's support for Ukraine since 2022: €8m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €118m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.11% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 0.25% toward Ukraine; near zero · 71% toward Russia).
Toward Russia by
0.11% of a year's GDP since 2022
near zero · 71% toward Russia
likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 0.25% toward Ukraine · €109m · ≈ 0.02%/yr
Its share of IMF and World Bank lending + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.11% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more fuel bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 71%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Share of IMF and World Bank lending only:
<0.01%
€8m
likely <0.01% to 0.06% essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.12%
€118m
likely from 0.48% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine near zero · 75% toward Russia
Russia kept €118m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war.
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Russia: 71%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 0.25% toward Ukraine.
Share of IMF and World Bank lending only: <0.01% · €8m
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €9m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.12% · €118m
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.07% | €67m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.05% | €51m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Venezuela kept more from selling to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2025: −€0.20bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€2m | +€38m | +€39m | +0.04% |
| 2023 | +€3m | +€31m | +€34m | +0.08% |
| 2024 | +€3m | −€13m | −€10m | +0.07% |
| 2025 | +<€1m | −€204m | −€204m | −0.15% |
| 2026* | +€1m | +€31m | +€32m | −0.11% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Venezuela's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €9mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €9m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €9m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €0.12bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.85bn in 2025 (+632%). It sold €1m to Russia in 2021 and €15m in 2025. For Venezuela: €51m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2025, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Venezuela's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crude oil | €0.12bn | €100mrange €45m to €0.17bn | €95m | C (estimate) |
| Oil products | €1.1bn | €0.95bnrange €0.48bn to €1.5bn | €1.1bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0m | €0m | €7m | – |
| Other goods | €0m | €0.22bn | – | |
| All goods | €1.2bn | €1.3bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Venezuela's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Venezuela. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €13m. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
€16m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Venezuela; what its firms kept of it, <€1m, is taken off its support.
Its direction is near zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
21 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 10 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 98% modelled (C) and 2% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −0.11% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 0.25% toward Ukraine; near zero · 71% toward Russia). Chance toward Russia: 71%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €118m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
It bought €0.85bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.12bn in 2021), and sold €15m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €118m (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war.
Almost nothing that can be measured: €8m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).
Its net is near zero: −0.11% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 0.25% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Colombia +0.15%, Guyana −<0.01%, Venezuela −0.11%, Brazil −0.51%.
21 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE); Its share of IMF and World Bank loans: Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Venezuela's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Venezuela.
Near zero
21 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/venezuela/